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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE
PROBLEM WITH THE PROBLEM-SOLVING
APPROACH
JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN*
ABSTRACT
Scholars and practitioners alike have recently pointed to the idea of a "new
moment" in the field qf law and economic development, as well as a hope for a
fruitful rethinking ofpolitical economy. The idea is that we have passed out qf the
period qf high "neoliberalism," associated at one time with Reagan, Thatcher,
and the so-called Washington Consensus and now eclipsed by the ascendance of
the Obama Administration. The hope attending the new consensus is that, in the
wake of neoliberal law and policy, the field of law and development might be on
the verge of a new round of experimental work going beyond the old patterns of
"free competition-state intervention" discourse. This Article affirms the notion
of a new moment, but is pessimistic about its meaning. After surveying two
phases in the intellectual history qf global law and development, the Article turns
to what Duncan Kennedy has described as the "thirdglobalization," a statement
on the characteristicqualities qf contemporary legal thought. In setting out these
qualities, I argue that they constitute a form qf legal pragmatism that is both new
and illustrative of our present condition. As for what this pragmatism means in
terms of providing a post-neoliberal direction for law and development, the
argument surveys the current exchange between two rival forms of pragmatic
governance: minimalism and experimentalism. The conclusion is darker than we
might like: although there does indeed seem reason to believe in a new turn
towards problem-solving in the field of economic development, it is a turn in
which our legal pragmatism too often promotes the old discursive patternsfrom
which we had hoped to escape.

* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. I am thankful for some general
comments on a prior version of this Article I received from Amy Cohen, David Kennedy, and Brian
Tamanaha. This Article is an expanded version of an essay first published as Experimental
Pragmatism in the Third Globalization, 9 CONTEMPORARY PRAGMATISM (2012).
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I. INTRODUCTION

The major claim in this Article is that the field of law and economic
development is helpfully understood in the light of an alliance between
"liberal legalism"' and "legal pragmatism." 2 Building off of Duncan
Kennedy's suggestion that much (if not all) of American Legal Thought is
constituted through a series of globalizing forms of legal consciousness,
the present argument holds that the current situation of the law and
development field is shaped by the confluence of two elements. On the
one hand, law and development practitioners work from a playbook that is
largely an assemblage of artifacts left over from prior moments in the
history of liberal legalism. The two basic pieces in the assembly include a
neoformalist commitment to the Rule of Law, and a neofunctionalist

1. For a discussion of liberal legalism in the sense that I am here suggesting see Justin
Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 387 (2012) and Justin DesautelsStein, Liberal Legalism and the Two State Action Doctrines, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. (forthcoming
2012).
2. Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemporary
Legal Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565 (2007).
3. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, in THE NEw LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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commitment to balancing techniques that purport to mediate conflicting
considerations. On the other hand, law and development practitioners are
committed to a pragmatic, "problem-solving" approach that sees itself as
"freestanding" 4 of ideological relationships with particular worldviews.
Thus, unlike the lawyer of bygone days who understood herself to see law
as managing a fairly crisp line between market and state, or a law which
had as its function the production of social welfare with little interest in
the line between market and state, today's pragmatic lawyer believes in
neither of these images of liberal law. She only believes in the pragmatic
necessity of shifting between the images as the situation demands,
enabling a fluidity in the quest for solving problems.
Of course, there are different sorts of problem-solving, and in the fields
of regulation and economic development, there are two obvious
candidates. On the one side is the "minimalism" of certain forms of
behavioral economics, sometimes associated with the likes of Cass
Sunstein and the "nudge." On the other side is the experimentalism of
"new governance" theorists like Charles Sabel and William Simon.6 In this
Article, I situate these new forms of legal pragmatism in the context of
Kennedy's story of legal thought, and my own take on liberal legalism.
Like many scholars of the moment, I agree that global thinking about
market-state relations in the development discourse has reached a new
position, albeit a deeply troubled one. In contrast to the hope that
pragmatism might triumph over formalism, for example, I see the new
pragmatism as enabling formalism instead of disarming it, and broadening
the blind spots of law and economics, instead of shrinking them.
In order to see how this happens, it is necessary to layer over Duncan
Kennedy's excellent architecture a story of liberalism and pragmatism and
the manner in which legal pragmatism has splintered in the context of
contemporary legal thought. Taking notice of this splintering is crucial,
since some forms of pragmatism are busily entrenching the stock defaults
of liberal legalism, while others at least have an intention of displacing, if
not dispensing them.
In the discussion that follows, I introduce Duncan Kennedy's three
styles of legal thought, and place them in the context of liberal legalism

4. Thomas Grey, FreestandingLegal Prgamatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 21 (1996).
5. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming
Rights: The PragmatistChallenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004).
7. David Trubek, "The Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in
THE NEw LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supranote 3, at 74, 93.
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and development economics. In particular, I suggest that legal pragmatism
provides an effective way of understanding how liberal legalism has been
disaggregated and reassembled in contemporary legal thought, and
examine the rise and fall of neoliberalism as illustrating two parts of our
present legal pragmatism. That is, instead of seeing two periods of
disenchantment-one after the 1970s and another in the early 21st
century-I argue that what emerged after 1970 was a single form of legal
consciousness that incorporates both a vital neoformalism as well as a
chastened one. The discussion concludes with a brief look at two forms of
legal pragmatism: "minimalism" and "experimentalism." Taking the
recent work of Charles Sabel and William Simon as illustrative of the
experimentalist position, the analysis first asks whether their brand of
experimental pragmatism is "contemporary" in Duncan Kennedy's sense
of the word, and if so, whether it might provide the sort of regulatory
apparatus David Kennedy has in mind for a new, heterogenous alliance.8
My answers are only preliminary, and will hopefully be the starting
point in further work. If we are looking for a conceptual bottom line here,
perhaps it can be said that a genuinely experimental style of problemsolving embraces a single proposition: the liberal narrative of "market and
state" should be displaced in favor of a counter-narrative which asks
"which market" and "which state"? 9 Or, to put it another way, perhaps
experimentalism might be stretched to oppose the traditional images of
liberal legalism by dismissing the idea that any particular agent-whether
that be a centralized government agency or the World Bank and IMF or a
particular recipe of private law rights-can see the future of economic
development and offer instructions for how to get there.' 0

8. David Kennedy, Law and Development Economics: Toward a New Alliance (2011) (on file
with author). For contrasting views, see, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilock, The
Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895
(2008); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development, 44
CORNELL INTL L.J. 209 (2011); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law, Orthodoxy, 1 33
(Carnegie Endowment Working Papers No. 30, 2002), available at http://camegieendowment.org/
2002/09/10/mythmaking-in-rule-of-law-orthodoxy/47s4.
9. Sanjay Reddy, Beyond the State Versus Market, 40 DEVELOPMENT 7 (1997); see also
ROBERTO M. UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED (2007); Charles Sabel, Bootstrapping Development:

Rethinking the Role of Public Intervention in Promoting Growth (Nov. 14, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers.htm; David M. Trubek,
Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New, Political Economy of Development and
Law 1-34 (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1075, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349163.
10. Charles Sabel & Sanjay Reddy, Learning to Learn: Undoing the Gordian Knot of
Development Today, 50 CHALLENGE 73, 74 (2007).
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In terms of what defines the content of an experimental style of
development economics, it's difficult to pinpoint in the absence of a
concrete problem to solve. To do otherwise might, as Sanjay Reddy has
suggested, undermine an appreciation of the "enormous and perhaps
inexhaustible constellation of yet unrealized possibilities" about the shape
of a democratized market economy." After all, experimentalists don't
believe in the possibility of being guided by right propositions, since
propositions can only be tested for their merit in the heat of actual
experiences in the here and now. As Reddy and Sabel have cautioned, it is
best to consider an experimental approach "not as an effort to lay
foundation stones of a new cathedral of development thinking, but rather
as an offering in the bazaar of collaborative work on a theme that concerns
us all."l2 For example, one vision of a democratized market economy
might be
characterized by the overcoming of segmentation and
subordination. It would favor deconcentration and delegation over
centralization of function and authority. It would distribute widely
the fruits of ownership as well as the privileges of control. It would
seek as primary ends full employment and the inclusion of the
excluded in the productive life of society. . . . Simultaneously, such
an economy would not be predicated on the sacrifice of material
prosperity, but rather would seek out areas of overlap between
material enhancement and the realization of democratic ends.
Finally, such an economy should strive to assure that the
conceptions of collective identity and of democratic possibility and
responsibility, in relation to which it gains life, do not end at
arbitrary boundaries, including those of the nation.13
As Sabel and Simon have argued, the experimentalist style of
administration is happening. Still in its infancy, it may be too soon to
judge much of its work, but at least in the United States and the European
Union, experimental pragmatism is hard at work. A next phase in the

research agenda should take a cue from these developments, and
interrogate the possibilities of a nascent experimentalism in the developing
world.

11. Reddy, supra note 9, at 8.
12. Sabel & Reddy, supranote 10, at 76.
13. Reddy, supra note 9, at 9.
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II. TWO MODES OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS

A. The FirstGlobalization: ClassicalLegal Thought
In Duncan Kennedy's map of American Legal Thought, a notion of
"legal consciousness" is framed in the language of semiotics, where a
consciousness is comprised of langue and parole.14 The langue provides
the fundamental elements of the consciousness-its mode of reasoning, its
conceptual vocabulary, and the like. In contrast is parole, which consists
in the actual speech-acts, the legal arguments themselves that are spoken
in the mode of the langue. Thus, while parole is relatively indeterminate
within the context of the structure of the langue, the langue itself is
identifiable as a discrete set of ideas. According to Kennedy, the langue of
classical legal thought ("CLT") is a combination of three big ideas:
(1) individualism, (2) a strict separation of the private sphere of the
common law rules from the public sphere of coercive state regulation, and
(3) a strategy of judicial interpretation known rather infamously as
formalism." Taken together, Kennedy described the basic mode of
reasoning in CLT as "the will theory,"16 which I might also characterize as
a distillation of classic liberal legalism.'
To get a feel for this style, it might be helpful to recall John Locke's
argument about property rights and freedom of contract in his Second
Treatise of Government.1 8 In Locke's version of the state of nature,
individuals enjoyed certain natural rights as a matter of their membership

14. Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147 (2001). More
generally, see FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Charles Bally & Albert

Sechehaye eds., Roy Harris trans., Open Court 1986) (1983).
15. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizationsof Law and Legal Thought, supra note 3, at 25-36.
16. Id. See also ROBERTO M. UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996);
Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's
"Consideration and Form", 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000); Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment

of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber 's Sociology in the Genealogy of the
Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031(2004); David M. Trubek,
Max Weber on Law, and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 720.
17. Though Kennedy did at an earlier point explicitly connect liberalism into his narrative, his
more recent work avoids any reference to the notion that liberalism plays a role in legal consciousness.

As a consequence, I should be very clear here that any arguments herein for connections between
"liberal legalism" and Kennedy's analysis of legal consciousness are mine alone, and still very
tentative. For a discussion of liberal legalism in this sense, see Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a

Legal Concept, supranote 1.
18. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1689). For classic discussions of
Locke, see, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1962);
BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (1972); ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS (1975).
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in the human race. These rights were fundamentally about individual
freedom, and as a consequence, they were rights that clearly distinguished
the "individualized" human being from the world of Aristotelian political
animals. Individuals were morally autonomous, subject to no higher
authority to which they had not consented. In this natural state of free and
equal individuals, market transactions evolved. Because people have
natural ownership over their persons, they also have natural ownership
over the labor their bodies produce. Once that labor is mixed with a good,
the good logically becomes that individual's property. As propertyowners, intelligent individuals tend to buy and sell their goods for a profit.
Thus, in Locke's state of nature things were pretty swell, except for the
fact that a person's property was never really very secure. So, in order to
actually create a market order, Locke believed it was necessary to legalize
property and the trade of property, or freedom of contract. As a result,
Locke argued for a deliverance from the state of nature into a political
society wherein the chief end of a new constitutional authority would be
the creation and maintenance of property and contract rights. 19
The three elements of Kennedy's model of classical legal thought are
vividly illustrated in this famous little story. The actors are highly
individualized in the sense that we are working after the major break with
Aristotelian ideas about the function and purpose of human beings; society
is split into a private sphere of pre-political (and pre-legal) natural rights
and a public sphere of arbitrary government and law; the work of jurists in
the public sphere are tasked with the enforcement of those natural truths
born in the private sphere but that are only realizable once they have been
legalized. To be clear, Kennedy is not suggesting that CLT was operating
as early as the 17th century; in fact he doesn't see it as emerging as a
recognizable style until after the Civil War. With a reign of more than half
a century, CLT as a form of legal consciousness began its slow decline
towards the end of the Nineteenth Century, and was finally branded
gauche by World War 11.20
B. The Second Globalization:Social Legal Thought and Development
Economics
In contrast to the high individualism of CLT, a new mode of legal
analysis, which Kennedy calls social legal thought, or "the social,"
involved a different set of ideas about how to use law as a means for

19. Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, supra note 1, at 410-23.
20. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizationsof Law and Legal Thought, supra note 3, at 37.
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arranging the social world. 2 1 The langue of social legal consciousness
involved ideas about social interdependence, the application of technical
expertise to the resolution of social problems, a preference for public
administration over free competition, a wider appreciation of civil and
political rights, and a judicial strategy of purposive interpretation that
sought to generate legal conclusions on the basis of perceived social
needs. Thus, where jurists operating in the CLT style would often seek the
resolutions of legal disputes via direct deductions from the natural truths
of the private, pre-political sphere, jurists in the social style would more
generally look for answers by asking questions about the social function of
a given legal regime.22 Once we knew what a law was supposed to
accomplish, and when we know whether we wanted it accomplished that
way, we could only then go on to say whether a legal dispute should be
resolved in one direction or another.23
In the same way that the langue of CLT might be characterized as a
classic style of "liberal legalism" a la Locke, the langue of social legal
consciousness might be characterized as the crystallization of "modern
liberalism." 24 Modern liberal legalism does not have the same sort of

21. Id. at 37-59.
22. For two rather different challenges to this story, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE
FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010); Pierre Schlag, Formalism

and Realism in Ruins (Mappingthe Logics ofCollapse), 95 IOWA L. REv. 195 (2010).
23. There are few limits to the sorts of available examples of the new purposive, instrumentalist,
functionalist jurisprudence that took off around this time. Perhaps the most famous example is Roscoe
Pound's The Scope and Purpose of SociologicalJurisprudence published in three parts between 1911
and 1912. 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REv. 140, 489 (1911-1912). For discussion, see
Julius Stone, Roscoe Pound and SociologicalJurisprudence,78 HARV. L. REV. 1578 (1964-1965).
24. Doctrinally, the canonical break with CLT was represented in the overruling of Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). In the field
of theories of capitalism, this shift is well-captured in the writings of thinkers like PAUL BARAN,
MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1966); PAUL BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (1957); JOHN
GAILBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1993); ABBA P.
LERNER, THE EcONOMIcs OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (1944). In politics, this

is captured in the process of the New Deal establishment. See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS (1998). In law, legal realism probably embodies at least the

critique of property and contract rights, if not the embrace of the welfare state. For discussion, see
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE (2001); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL,

AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (2011). According to Roberto Unger,

there are three characteristics of the modem liberal style. "First, its continuing commitment to the
welfare state and to investment in the people, as both an end in itself and a condition of economic
success; second, a desire to rid the regulated market economy of statist, corporatist, and oligopolistic
constraints upon economic flexibility and innovation, especially in the transition to a postfordist style
of industrial organization, accompanied by sympathy toward bottom-up association and participation
by people in local government and social organization; and third, an unabashed institutional
conservatism, expressed in skepticism about large projects of institutional reconstruction and in the
acceptance of the current legal forms of market economies, representative democracies, and free civil
societies." UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?, supra note 16, at 10. Modern
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canonical representatives as classic liberalism, but its shortage of
Olympian authorship is made up for in the staggering breadth of the
writing that has been done in its service. A likely candidate for the master
of the modern liberal style is Keynes,2 5 but representatives are available
from both the left and the right of the Keynesian emphasis on welfarism,
administration, and employment.2 6 Indeed, Frank Knight, a founding
member of the Chicago School, and Henry Carter Adams, one of the early
writers in the first wave of institutional economics, have much in common
with respect to a new role for law-a role that would stand in deep tension
with judicial commitments to the will theory.27
Let's take two examples of social legal thought, one from the Supreme
Court and one from the academy. In the Supreme Court's 1948 decision in
Shelley v. Kraemer, the topic was restrictive covenants: the capacity of
property owners to prospectively determine to whom their land could, and
could not, eventually pass. The controversial aspect of these covenants,
however, was that they excluded the possibility on the basis of race. After
a black family took ownership of a home that had been subject to a racially
restrictive covenant, a neighboring family brought an action to enjoin the
purchasers from taking residence. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed
with the neighbors and held the covenant to be effective and enforceable.
In approaching the question, the court was appropriately modest as the
modern style would indicate: the majority did not hold all private
agreements to have the color of state action, even though our notions of
"bargain" and "ownership" would be meaningless in the absence of some
constituting legal regime. 29 Thus, the division between the independent
market and the regulating state still held firm: "[R]estrictive agreements
standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to
petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of

liberalism was just as concerned with economic development as was its classic ancestor, but where the
classic style was preoccupied with how to establish a legal framework for market society (just as is
today's development practitioner), the modem liberal style was created to deal with the consequences
of the free competition model. As Roberto Unger has explained, the modern style sought to keep
"-present institutional arrangements while controlling their consequences: by counteracting,
characteristically, through tax-and-transfer or through preferment for disadvantaged groups, their
distributive consequences." Id. at 29. See also Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, supra
note 1, at 423-44.
25. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizationsof Law and Legal Thought, supra note 3, at 57.
26. For an interesting discussion of Keynes, Laski, and Hayek, see KENNETH R. HOOVER,
ECONOMICS AS IDEOLOGY (2003).

27. See Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, supra note 1, at 432-44.
28. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
29.

(1976).

FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 35
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those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it
would appear clear that there has been no action by the State and the
provisions of the Amendment have not been violated."30 That dividing
line, though it would hold, was nevertheless about to take a beating: "But
here there was more. These are cases in which the purposes of the
agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts of
the restrictive terms of the agreements." Voluntary agreements between
individuals seeking to buy and sell land, the court explained, did not
implicate the state. The judicial enforcement of those agreements,
however, did.
Several beliefs common to social legal thought are here: (1) free
competition in the market can have morally repugnant results;
(2) government needs to intervene, aggressively if need be, to counteract
those tendencies if the market is to be sustainable; (3) some amount of
space, necessarily left undefined, should be left to the natural sphere of the
market. Shelley brings it home: the court was deeply troubled by the social
consequences of an unchecked property/contract matrix with respect to
racial inequalities; the court argued for a more "realistic" view of the state,
which definitively exercised its power not only through the executive and
the legislature, but through its courts as well; the court still managed to
carve out an area where the state was believed absent.
On the academic side, the corpus of work from Harold Lasswell, Myres
McDougal, and later W. Michael Reisman, or what was more colloquially
known as "McDougal & Associates," is similarly illustrative. Like many
others of their generation, 32 Lasswell and McDougal were post-realists in
the sense that they were deeply informed by early 20th century attacks on
both the liberalism and formalism of classic legal thought. That is, they
were convinced of not only the morally unacceptable nature of laissezfaire, but also the intellectual bankruptcy of formalistic thinking about law
and policy. Legal realists, and those like Lasswell and McDougal who
were working in the early wake of the realist onslaught, were all beholden
to the emergence of American Pragmatism. The hand of John Dewey, for
instance, is explicit in the work of famous realists like Felix Cohen and

30. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.
31. Id. at 13-14.
32. See generally MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1979).

33. See generally SCHLEGEL, supranote 24.
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Walter Wheeler Cook,34 as well as in the tremendously influential work of
Lasswell and McDougal.
Lasswell and McDougal's "Policy Perspective" steadily developed
over the course of the 20th century as what is probably best understood as
an international variant of the legal process school. At bottom, the idea
was to take many of Dewey's insights and elevate them beyond critique
and into institutional form. This new institutionalism would be guided by
the freshest of cutting edge thinking about real social problems, the
functional nature of law, an understanding of the deeply political nature of
law, and a process-oriented program in which a legal regime would be put
under constant pressure for reappraisal due to persistent exposure to local
instances of problem-solving. In Dewey's fashion, the basic goals of the
regime would be very broad-in their case, it was "human dignity"-and
the actual meaning of the goal would only be discovered through practice,
and not before it. The goal values could be achieved only through
''continuous reappraisal of the circumstances in which specific
institutional combinations can make the greatest net contribution to the
over-arching goal."3 6 To the extent that the goal might find itself
manifested differently in the specifics of various local contexts, these
"varying detailed practices by which the overriding goals are sought need
not necessarily be fatal . . . but can be made creative in promoting [our

goals] .
Of course, given that Lasswell and McDougal's approach became a
school of thought in its own right, it would be misleading to suggest that
these were the indelible hallmarks of the New Haven School, but at least
in 1959, this much was clear. In that year, Lasswell and McDougal
published one of the seminal tracts of their new post-realist policy
approach in "The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order." 38 As mentioned, the fundamental point of departure was
premised on avoiding old debates about the distinction between law and
politics, or state and market. In order to bypass administrative hangups
like these, the new policy perspective required open-mindedness from its

34. Id.
35. Lasswell, a scholar of political science, psychology, communications, and law, worked
directly in Dewey's shadow while at the University of Chicago in the 1920s. For discussions of the
approach of the New Haven School, see McDougal's Jurisprudence, 79 AM. SOC'Y INTL L. PROC.
266 (1985); Symposium, The Neiw New, Haven School, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 299 (2007).
36. Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse
Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1959) (emphasis omitted).
37. Id. at 6.
38. See McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 36.
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agents whereby "the institutional details of all systems of public order are
open to reconsideration in the light of the contribution they will make to
the realization of human dignity in theory and fact." 39 The basic
architecture involved a series of tasks for the administrator: (1) orient
oneself to the largest possible context of evolving social processes; 40
(2) develop an understanding of how local communities generate
expectations about the process of authoritative decision-making, whether
these decisions are located in the public or private sphere; 41 (3) take a view
of regulation as a mixture of prescriptive norms, softer recommendations,
the application of both hard and soft norms, and an ongoing appraisal of
the work of the norms at the street-level; 4 2 and (4) keep in mind the
broader framework goal of furthering human dignity, and in keeping with
post-realist preference for process over rule, think of this goal as
deliberately open-ended and as "a social process in which values are
widely and not narrowly shared, and in which private choice, rather than
coercion, is emphasized as the predominant modality of power." 43
Roughly around the time that the US Supreme Court began its
courtship of the modern liberal style and scholars like Lasswell and
McDougal started building their post-realist machinery, lawyers and
economists began an effort to theorize the export of the industrial model of
economic development to the Third World. There is little doubt that
attempts in the West to "civilize," "modernize," and "develop" the nonWest began well before World War II.44 Nevertheless, the notion that it

39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 7-8.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id. at 9-10.
43. Id at 11.
44. As John Ohnesorge has similarly pointed out, "Today's histories of law and development
typically begin during the modernization era of the 1950s and 1960s, though this fails to address the
central role of law and legal imposition in the era of colonization. However, it is fair to date the current
mode of law and development activities to the 1960s, when primarily Western governments,
institutions, and academics became involved with the legal systems of many developing and newlyindependent countries." John K. M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and
Development Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 22223 (2007). There is any number of points in the historical record that might be chosen as a starting
point for the West's "civilizing" mission. An example would be the work of Francisco Vitoria, who in
the early Sixteenth Century advised King Charles of the Habsburg Empire on the legalities and
arguments in favor of the conquest of the New World. Among these arguments was the idea that
through exposure to Spanish culture and Christian religion, the Indians would engage in trade and
generate economic development in the European tradition. Francisco Vitoria, On the American
Indians, in VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS 278-84 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 2008).
For discussions of Vitoria, see ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INTL L.J. I
(1986). More generally, see MARTH KOSKENIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS (2002).
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was at this time that the Western industrialized nations first took hold of
the idea-in the wake of a frightening, postwar economic climate-is
commonplace in the literature on development studies. 45 To be sure, there
is much sense to the argument that, surveying a broken Europe, the United
States perceived a brave new market waiting to be opened in the colonized
world. But two obstacles stood in the way. First, the former colonies
would need to establish their political independence so they could transact
in the global economy as sovereign states. 46 Next, they would need to
develop their economies in line with modern industrialized societies.4 7
These two problems called for a division of labor, where diplomats and
lawyers would handle the former, and economists would tackle the latter.
Thus was born the field of development economics.
The names Ragnar Nurkse, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Albert Hirschman,
Arthur Lewis, and Walt Whitman Rostow, are typically associated with
this first wave of work in the 1950s, all of whom were generally
influenced by Keynes.48 As a result, their prescriptions for economic
development all tended to gravitate around a core set of ideas. Among
them were a focus on savings and investment, methods for augmenting
demand over worries about supply shortages, and above all an image of an
aggressive, large-scale, interventionist government. Markets were
important, to be sure, but only insofar as they produced results in keeping
with theories of distributive justice, and not because of any particular
ideals the rules of the market might have otherwise symbolized.
As a result of this confined idea about market performance, tasks that
the market might fail should be picked up by state agencies. Consequently,
some of the big ideas that came out of this period were the theory of the
big push (the idea that a synchronized plan of several major industrial
investments would lead to a chain reaction of "virtuous circles"

45. See, e.g., JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

98 (2009).
46.

For discussion of the decolonization process under international law, see ANGHIE, supra note

44; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).

47. For histories, see ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF THE REST: CHALLENGES TO THE WEST
FROM LATE-INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES (2001); H. W. ARNDT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE
HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1987); GERALD M. MEIER, BIOGRAPHY OF A SUBJECT: AN EVOLUTION OF
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (2005); GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN
ORIGINS TO GLOBAL FAITH (2002). For critical analysis, see ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING
DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD (1995); RETHINKING
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Ha-Joon Chang ed., 2003).
48. THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936) was Keynes' most
influential text. For some recent examinations of Keynes, see MICHAEL S. LAWLOR, THE ECONOMICS
OF KEYNES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT (2006); DONALD MARKWELL, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2006).
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multiplying their effects through the economy); 49 the theory of unbalanced
growth (the idea that massive investment in only key industrial sectors,
due to scarcity of resources, would create supply bottlenecks elsewhere in
the economy, with the effect of creating pressure for new investment
"linkages" between industry partners); 50 the theory of surplus labor (the
idea that the problem of having too few workers employed in higherincome positions could be remedied through transferring workers from
agriculture to industry without doing harm to the agricultural sector due to
the establishment of more efficient means of labor);51 the theory of stages
of growth (the idea that all developed societies move through a series of
progressive stages, including the destruction of traditional society and the
setting of industrialization's "preconditions," and the "take-off' into
sustained development).
Though also writing in this same period, writers like Raul Prebisch,5
Andre Gunder Frank, and Gunnar Myrdal belong to a separate group of
development economists due to their shared theses about how the structure
of trade relations was deeply flawed in a way that favored the West at the
expense of the rest. 54 For Prebish and his early version of dependency
theory, the idea was that as long as industrialized nations export
manufactured goods, and the Third World exports raw materials for use in
those goods, the benefits of trade would always accumulate at the center,
and at the risk of harming the periphery.5 5 Following this diagnosis, some

49.

RAGNAR NURKSE, PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL FORMATION IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

(1953); Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, The Theory of the Big Push, in LEADING ISSUES IN ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT 3d (Gerald Meier ed., 1976).
50. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1958).

51. W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development ivith Unlimited Supplies of Labour, 22 MANCH.
SCH. EcoN. Soc. 139 (1954)
52. W. W. RosTow, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO
(1960).
53. See generally CommercialPolicy in the Underdeveloped Countries,49 AM. EcoN. REV. 251
(1959); The Economic Development of Latin America and Its PrincipalProblems, U.N. Dep't of
Econ., U.N. Doc. E/CN.12/89/rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 1950.II.G.2 (1950).
54. Two other well-known economists that are also said to belong to the "heterodox" school
include Clarence Ayres and Gunnar Myrdal. CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 45, at 180. Both writers
were associated with institutional economics, which Cypher and Dietz define as an academic focus on
the "institutions of an economy, that is, the forms of productions, ownership, work processes, and
ideologies which combine to create an economy and society. . . . Since, furthermore, such institutions
are subject to evolutionary change, the process of studying economics should also properly be
evolutionary." Id. For representative publications, see C.E. Ayres, Economic Development: An
Institutionalist Perspective, in LATIN AMERICA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 89 (James L. Dietz ed.,
1991); GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POVERTY (1970).

55. This idea also became associated with the work of Hans Singer, and what was later labeled
the "Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis." See H.W. Singer, Terms of Trade and Economic Development, in
THE NEW PALGRAVE: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989); JOHN TOYE &
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development economists tailored their proposals to a refashioning of the
internal markets of developing countries in order to shift away from raw
exports and towards manufactured goods.
The basic idea was that
governments first needed to set up strict tariff barriers, barring access to
foreign firms wishing to sell manufactured goods in the local market. If
the developing state failed to do this, and left its borders open to "free
trade," local producers would never stand a chance in bringing cheap and
simple durable goods to market. If foreign competition was eliminated,
local producers could slowly build their infant industries, and while
consumers would suffer insofar as they faced less choices in the market,
this was viewed as the kind of strong medicine required to move forward.
Thus, this strategy substituted local manufactured goods for imports as a
vehicle for the industrialization process.
All in all, the 1960s and '70s had its share of optimists and critics,
arguing in turn for in many cases large, and in other cases very large
amounts of state "control" over developing markets. In terms of a
general consensus among economists at the "center," the 1960s was
probably a decade in which there was more hope than pessimism, touched
off with the exciting prospect that much of the developing world was
about to take flight via the logic of Rostow's theory of growth (published
in 1960), and the anointing by the United Nations of the coming years as a

RICHARD TOYE, THE UN AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2004). "In this perspective, the

more advanced center countries tend to reap the gains from international trade and investment at the
expense of the less-developed periphery. Indeed, trade relations between the center and periphery
reinforce higher levels of development in the center countries, while maintaining a relatively lower
level of development and poverty in the periphery. In Prebisch and Singer's analysis, then, free trade
can actually be harmful to the peripheral, less-developed nations." CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 45, at
175.
56. "The principal characteristic of structuralism is that it takes as its object of investigation a
'system,' that is, the reciprocal relations among parts of a whole, rather than the study of the different
parts in isolation. In a more specific sense this concept is used by those theories that hold that there are
a set of social and economic structures that are unobservable but which generate observable social and
economic

phenomena."

J.G.

Palma,

Structuralism, in

THE

NEW

PALGRAVE:

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT, supra note 55, at 316. Gerald Meier has described dependency theory as contending
that "development problems of the periphery are to be understood in terms of their insertion into the
international capitalist system, rather than the terms of domestic considerations." MEIER, supra note
47, at 66. The problems of dependence by the developing countries on the developed world "may refer
not only to deterioration in the peripheral country's terms of trade but also to unequal bargaining
power in foreign investment, transfer of technology, taxation, and relations with multinational
corporations." Id. For representative writing, see PAUL A. BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
GROWTH, supra note 24; CELSO FURTADO, THE ECONoMIC GROWTH OF BRAZIL (1963). The name for

this shift is import substitution industrialization. For discussion, see CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 45,
at 271-98.
57. David Kennedy, The "Rule of Law, " PoliticalChoices, and Development Common Sense, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supranote 3, at 95, 98-110.
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"Decade of Development."5' Alas, the 1970s witnessed substantial
disillusionment with these theories, as evidence mounted in opposition to
the idea that economic development in the Third World was really
happening, or at least, happening in any sort of predictable or consistent
59
way.
Perhaps even more importantly, 1973 marked the beginning of
transition in the global economy. 60 It was in that year that the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") announced its price hike on
oil exports, sending the world market into a tizzy. The Third World took
an especially hard hit, forced to look for loans to replenish their quickly
diminishing foreign exchange reserves. The process by which these
nations ultimately found a new source of cash, though well-known and
well-told, remains bizarre. 61 OPEC states witnessed a hurricane of
incoming profits as a result of the price increase, so much so that many
states simply didn't have enough available opportunities to invest the
funds. Needing somewhere to grow the money, they turned to the large
investment banks in New York, London, and elsewhere. These banks, in
turn, then faced the difficulty of finding enough borrowers to generate the
interest they would have to pay the OPEC states. Where could the banks
turn? Oddly, those very countries being squeezed by the price hike, and
looking for loans to cover their increasing deficits, were the perfect market
for the banks. Thus, the banks created the idea of the "sovereign
borrower," and the phenomenon known as petrodollar recycling-the
movement of Third World payments to OPEC states, funneled to the

58. President John F Kennedy inaugurated the "Development Decade" in an address before the
United Nations General Assembly in 1961. "[We] must not divert our eyes or our energies from the
harsh realities that face our fellow men. Political sovereignty is but a mockery without the means of
meeting poverty and illiteracy and disease. Self-determination is but a slogan if the future holds no
hope. That is why my nation, which has freely shared its capital and its technology to help others help
themselves, now proposes officially designating this decade of the 1960s as the United Nations Decade
of Development." President John F. Kennedy, Address Before the General Assembly of the United
Nations (Sept. 25, 1961), available at http://wwwjfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Refernce/JFKSpeeches/Address-Before-the-General-Assembly-of-the-United-Nations-September-25-1961.aspx. For
discussion, see RICHARD JOLLY, Louis EMMERIJ, DHARAM GHAI & FREDERIC LAPEYRE, UN
CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT THINKING AND PRACTICE 85 (2004).

59. Gerald Meier writes: "Concern about government failure became a landmark turning point in
the thinking about development in the 1970s and 1980s. Contrary to the early development
economists' advocacy of centralized government interventions to remedy market failures, an orthodox
reaction now focused on government failure and its antidote of neoclassical economics." MEIER, supra
note 47, at 81.
60. See generally SCOTT NEWTON, THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1944-2000:
IDEOLOGY (2004).

61. For discussion, see CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 45, at 529-48.
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private investment banks, and loaned back to the Third World in order to
make payments to OPEC.
In contrast to these developments in development economics, what of
the modern style of liberal legalism? Was it true that lawyers were only
concerned with making colonies into sovereigns? While it cannot be
denied that international lawyers were certainly preoccupied with
"decolonization," by and large it was domestic lawyers, coming from the
social sciences, who worked to assist the developing world in the
establishment of transplanted legal systems. Looking back from 1974,
Marc Galanter and David Trubek saw the "law and development"
movement as having six propositions animating this project. 62- First, the
state must be recognized as the focal point of social control, though the
state should never be viewed as a moral end in itself.6 Its purpose is to
facilitate the efforts of individuals to pursue their preferences, though
these preferences are subject to the state's coercive restrictions. Second,
the state's facilitative and coercive functions are always subject to the
legal order which consists of general, universal, and neutral constraints on
public authority.64 Third, the rules in the legal order are "consciously
designed to achieve social purposes" by a democratically organized
electorate in which all members are free and equal in their opportunities to
make their voices heard.65 Fourth, these rules are applied equally, and
consistently with their purposes. 66 Fifth, the judiciary is the central
institution in the legal order, since it has the last word on a particular rule's
social meaning.6 7 Sixth, these rules have a quasi-organic quality inasmuch
as citizens have largely internalized the rules, and officials take the rules
as guides before listening to their private and personal bases for decisionmaking.68 Taken together, "a legal system is an integrated purposive entity
which draws on the power of the state but disciplines that power by its
own autonomous and internally derived norms." 69
In this period before the rise of neoliberalism and the Rule of Law
program, the primary focus of lawyers trying to use law as a means of
economic development was to take this set of modern liberal ideas, and

62. David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the
Crisis in Law and Development Studies, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1062 (1974).
63. Id. at 1071.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1072.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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teach it to the judges, lawyers, and law students of the Third World. 0 The
hope was that, just as this image of an empowered class of legal
professionals in the Western world generated the modern market society,
so would it to do the same elsewhere." As for what precisely it would do,
the idea was that a transplanted liberal legal order would promote freedom,
equality, community, and ultimately enhance social welfare through a
series of spillover effects. Liberalization in one sector of developing
society, be it through import substitution or the creation of an AngloAmerican judiciary, would hopefully bring about a ripple of modernizing
effects. Deng Xiao Ping's effort to liberalize China's economy in 1978, for
example, was widely believed to be a precursor to liberal democracy and
- * * 72
civil rights.
Despite the fundamental focus on legal education, this period was
nevertheless accompanied by an armada of changes to the legal fabric of
the importing society: "' Import substitution' industrialization demanded
the creation of numerous public law institutions, established by statute and
implemented by public law bureaucracies: exchange controls, credit
licensing schemes, tariffs, subsidy programs, tax incentives, price controls,
national commodity monopolies."73 These transformations were new to
most developing states, "replacing colonial law, overturning customary
law, and offering a largely public law framework for economic
exchange."74 An explicit focus by "law and development" practitioners on
the strengthening of local legal elites, and the need for a background
recognition that a transplanted image of the modern welfare state brought
with it a dense web of legal requirements, was also accompanied by a
perceived need for international laws that could track the ground rules and
govern the development process from "above." Most notably, the
motivation in giving law and development an international orientation
drew from the ideas spinning out of dependency theory: if there was
something broken in terms of international trade, international law seemed
the natural hope for legislating a "revision of the global economic and
political order."75

70. David Trubek, supra note 7, at 76-77.
71. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 62, at 1075. For a contemporary critique of the economic
mind-set, see RENTS, RENT-SEEKING, AND EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT IN

ASIA (Mushtag Khan & KS Jomo eds., 2000).
72. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2006).

73. David Kennedy, PoliticalChoices and Development Common Sense, supra note 57, at 102.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 115. Although much of the inspiration for this movement came from scholars living in
the Third World, international lawyers based at the Columbia and N.Y.U. Law Schools were pivotal.
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The shift to international law was largely taken by international
lawyers from the Third World, and the most prominent manifestation in
this context was the call for a "New International Economic Order.""
Articulated as a Declaration at a session of the United Nations General
Assembly, the ideas behind the NIEO were big ones: the new international
legal order would be "based on equity, sovereign equality,
interdependence, common interest, and cooperation among all states
irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct
inequalities and redress existing injustices, and make it possible to
eliminate the widening gap between the developed and developing
countries."" The movement crystallized in Mohammad Bedjaoui's
Towards a New InternationalEconomic Order, published in 1979, but was
already being excavated only a few years later for the lessons of its
failure .
III. THE THIRD GLOBALIZATION: LEGAL PRAGMATISM

Thus far, we have reviewed the first two phases in Duncan Kennedy's
story of American Legal Thought. I provided a snippet of Lockean
property theory as a way of glimpsing the basic style of classical legal
thought, and touched on the Supreme Court's Shelley decision and the
early vision of the New Haven School as reflections of "the social." In
addition, I relayed a very cursory telling of the conventional beginnings of
the field known as "law and development," and situated that field in the
context of modern liberalism and social legal thought. In the discussion
that follows, I first present Kennedy's third phase of legal consciousness,
and then reframe it in the language of pragmatism and liberalism. I then
suggest that the pragmatic "problem-solving" approach of contemporary
legal thought is nicely illustrated in the current posture of the law and
development field. After a review of the neoliberal pairing of the Rule of
Law ideal with the World Bank's subsequent interest in the "conflicting
considerations" approach, the discussion then turns to "experimental

Oscar
Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (1976);
Thomas Franck, The New Development, Can American Law and Legal Institutions Help Developing
Countries?, 12 Wis. L. REv. 767 (1972).
See, e.g., WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964);

76.

For a recent discussion,

see BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL

LAW FROM

BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).

77. Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (SVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974).
78. David Kennedy, PoliticalChoices and Development Common Sense, supra note 57, at 11728.
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pragmatism." Many scholars are now seeking shelter in the term, offering
it as a route out of the contemporary gridlock. From the perspective of
liberal legalism, the discussion asks whether an experimentalist
perspective on problem-solving, at least in the hands of influential scholars
like Charles Sabel, William Simon, and Cass Sunstein, provides us with
such a route. My conclusion is hedged, but ultimately suggests that
experimentalism will have a really hard time being "experimental" so long
as its methods are so deeply rooted in the liberal styles of the 20th century.
A. Neoformalism and the Conflicting ConsiderationsApproach
In his description of contemporary legal thought, Duncan Kennedy has
suggested that the present mode of legal analysis consists in the
transformed elements of both CLT and social legal consciousness.79 That
is, where we might be tempted to see a social antithesis to a classical
thesis, there is no synthesis to be found in contemporary legal thought.
There is no new, dominant set of ideas that can be contrasted with the
ideas of previous periods. Instead, we have the debris left over after the
attack on CLT, as well as the debris left over from the various critiques
deployed against the social, including those movements that emerged in
the 1970s like neoliberal styles of legal discourse in the form of the law
and economics approach, neoformalist critiques from within the discourse
of modern liberalism, like liberal constitutionalism and republicanism, and
styles of critique attempting to stand outside of liberal legalism altogether,
like critical legal studies.
Consequently, Kennedy suggests that while contemporary legal
thought lacks a large integrating concept, we can nevertheless identify two
basic and ultimately contradictory kinds of langue: neoformalism,
transformed from its origins in CLT, and the balancing of conflicting
considerations, transformed from its functionalist origins in social legal
consciousness. There is no end to the sorts of examples we might choose
to illustrate the combination of these modes of reasoning, and so to take
one at random, consider the U.S. Supreme Court's 2008 decision in
Medellin v. Texas.80 The case was a controversial one, dealing with the
double approach of the United States judiciary to the International Court
of Justice's Avena decision,81 and a subsequent executive order from U.S.

79. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizationsof Law and Legal Thought, supra note 3, at 63-73.
80. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
81. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
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President George W. Bush seeking to implement that decision. 82 The
dispute made its way to the ICJ via a complaint from Mexico against the
United States, in which the former claimed that the latter had violated
certain rights due to Mexican nationals under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. The ICJ ruled that U.S. officials had failed to fulfill
those obligations, and President Bush ordered the state courts of Texas to
review the conviction of the identified Mexican nationals in light of
Avena. 3
The question before the Supreme Court was what to make of all this.
After sweeping aside the idea that the US Supreme Court was obliged to
follow orders either from the ICJ or the US President, the Court sought to
independently answer the question of whether the US had certain
obligations under the Vienna Convention, and in the parlance of the
controversy, whether that treaty was self-executing. The Court was split.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts made a series of sharply
defined neoformalist moves.
First, Roberts acknowledged the validity and efficacy of international
law. "No one disputes that the Avena decision ... constitutes an
international law obligation on the part of the United States."84 Roberts
made it clear that the relevant question here was not whether international
legal obligations exist, per se, but whether in this case it was possible to
deduce a directly effective legal obligation from any relevant treaties
regarding these Mexican nationals residing in Texas. This question, it
turned out, was easy. The majority's approach was this: Once the relevant
texts are examined, a court is obliged to follow a legal formula instructing
it to search out any language providing a private party with a right to
enforce the treaty. Upon finding such language, a court should determine
that the treaty is directly effective in court. Without the language, it's not.
Roberts didn't find anything on point, and in the absence of the operative
words, the majority concluded with a third point: "where a treaty does not
provide a particular remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for the
courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of their own."85
This conception regarding an important distinction between law-making
and law-applying, where the business of law-makers is necessarily
ideological and the business of law-appliers is objective, was further
elaborated in Justice Robert's critique of Justice Breyer's dissent.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Medellin, 552 U.S. at 502.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 513-14 (quoting Sanchez-Lamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006)).
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In making an argument that has all the hallmarks of the conflicting
considerationsapproach, Breyer suggested that the presence or absence of
certain language is totally beside the point. 86 In contrast to Roberts' focus
on formal rules, Breyer's claim was that the "case law suggests practical,
context-specific criteria" that should be used to help a court decide
whether a treaty was self-executing. Breyer's approach demanded answers
to a series of fact-based questions, such as the purpose of the treaty, its
historical and political context, and whether the treaty seemed more or less
focused on judicial application or not. Breyer recognized that these sorts
of questions did not yield "a simple test, let alone a magical formula."
But given the actual and realistic unavailability of a meaningful textual
approach like Roberts', the focus on the function of the treaty and the
effort to balance all the extraneous factors is all a court can really ever
hope to do.
The majority was unhappy with this response. Justice Roberts argued
that Breyer's notions were notoriously ad hoc, indeterminate, incapable of
actually providing predictable guidance, and probably most important of
all, "tantamount to vesting with the judiciary the power not only to
interpret but also to create the law." 88
Medellin provides a good example of how the language of classic
liberalism and modern liberalism oscillates in the standard moves of our
contemporary jurisprudence. That is, as Kennedy rightly argues, the
modes of reasoning that defined classical legal thought and social legal
thought have not been borrowed wholesale from prior moments in the
history of our jurisprudence. We have not looked into the closets of our
parents, and thrilled at the sight of clothes thought hideous by a former
generation. Contemporary legal thought is a new breed: neoformalism is
not the will theory, and the conflicting considerations approach is not
welfarist functionalism.
These insights into the present situation do not, however, require us to
see contemporary legal consciousness as only a pile of scattered debris.
One possibility is that there actually is a new integrating concept, a new
langue that can explain and embody the strange union of the transformed
elements of the classic and modern forms of liberal legalism. That
integrating concept could be something called "pragmatism." 89 An

86. Id. at 549.
87. Id. at 550.
88. Id. at 516.
89. Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics, supra note 2; see also Justin Desautels-Stein,
Extraterritoriality,
Antitrust, and the PragmatistStyle, 22 EMORY INTL L. REV. 499 (2008).
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immediate question is whether pragmatism is new, and our intuition may
very well be to say that its not. Let us then disaggregate the term a bit in
order to see if there is something about pragmatism that is indigenous to
contemporary legal consciousness.
A first category is "philosophical pragmatism." 90 This is a pragmatism
that holds itself out as a way of thinking about epistemology, ethics, isoughts, universals, consequentialism, and other standards in the canons of
moral and political philosophy.9' The founding triumvirate, as is well
known, includes Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey.
There may be less consensus when we start to think about the availability
of a body of work called "neo-pragmatist," but the nature of the
conversation is pretty familiar. It's a conversation about the likes of
Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Stanley Fish, Jurgen Habermas, Richard
Bernstein, and others that have attempted to interpret the older generation
of pragmatists in light of a more particular theory of what philosophical
pragmatism entails.92 With respect to either brand of philosophical
pragmatism, it is clear that neither is couched as a theory of law. To be
sure, many of these scholars have applied the prior work to legal
questions, but it's always a matter of philosophy applied to law, not
pragmatism as a theory of law first.93
In contrast to philosophical pragmatism is a second category,
popularized by Richard Posner.94 This is an "everyday pragmatism" in the
vernacular. It is the pragmatism that is constantly deployed in the
newspapers, by pundits and politicians.9 5 It is almost universally
understood in the context of the United States as a badge of honor to be
known as a pragmatist. These pragmatists are against ideology, against

90. For discussion, see JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY (1957); WILLIAM
JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE: AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY (1979); HILARY
PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2002); HILARY
PUTNAM,

REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY (1981);

RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND

SOLIDARITY (1989); RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); RICHARD RORTY,

PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). For representatively general treatments, see
CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: ITS CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Sandra B. Rosenthal et al. eds.,
1999); Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001); JOHN P. MURPHY, PRAGMATISM: FROM

PIERCE TO DAVIDSON (1990); THE PRAGMATIC TURN IN PHILOSOPHY: CONTEMPORARY
ENGAGEMENTS BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL THOUGHT (William Eggington & Mike
Sandbothe eds., 2004); PRAGMATISM, CRITIQUE, JUDGMENT: ESSAYS FOR RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
(Seyla Benhabib & Nancy Fraser eds., 2004); THE RANGE OF PRAGMATISM AND THE THE LIMITS OF
PHILOSOPHY (Richard Shusterman ed., 2004).

91.
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Desautels-Stein, At War ivith the Eclectics, supra note 2, at 576-86.
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foundational theory, against theories of truth or right. They will do what
they need to do in order to get it done. Whatever works. Action-oriented
thinking. "Just Do It." 96 President Obama has consistently portrayed
himself as a pragmatist, and against ideology, in precisely the same way
that his opponents on the right do the same thing.97
Of course, there are many complaints about everyday pragmatism. One
is that it appears to have nothing at all do with its philosophical cousin.
Among many other things, philosophical pragmatism is explosive. For the
believer, it renders so many propositions about the known world into fuzz.
Everything opens up for the serious pragmatist, where the well-known
saying about William James becomes a saying about everything: "He was
so extremely natural that there was no knowing what his nature was, or
what to expect next."98 In this way of thinking, nature becomes a site of
constant knowing and unknowing, where little if anything can be said
about the way things ought to be done. It is an undeniably subversive
approach to world order. In contrast, the everyday pragmatist is a soldier
in favor the status quo. She doesn't believe in a so-called ideology,
wanting only to tinker at the margins, slowly and incrementally. It's a
view of the world that basically takes it as it is, hoping to slowly make it
better, but knowing that it's already pretty good to begin with.
A third category of pragmatism is legal pragmatism, and it is legal
pragmatism that may offer us a language that can capture the modes of
reasoning we see in our contemporary jurisprudence. In terms of mapping
legal pragmatism itself, there appear to be several varieties. 99 One is
"eclectic pragmatism." Eclectic pragmatism is easy to understand, since it
is essentially the layering of everyday pragmatism onto the problematics
of legal discourse. Just as everyday pragmatism is alienated from
philosophical pragmatism, so is eclectic pragmatism. It is this divorce that
has led writers like Posner, Rorty, and Tom Grey to all make the claim for

96. Apparently, Nike's famous slogan came about after an ad man praised Nike for its brazenly
"can-do" attitude, and said, "You Nike guys, you just do it." Nike's Just Do It Advertising Campaign,
Center for Applied Research, available at http://www.cfar.com/Documents/nikecmp.pdf.
97. In transforming himself in preparation for his candidacy for President, Newt Gingrich
attempted to situate himself more pragmatically. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For Gingrich in
Power, Pragmatism, not Purity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2011.
98. MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB, supra note 90, at 77 (quoting George Santayana).

99. In this Article, I am concerned with "eclectic pragmatism" and "experimental pragmatism."
Another, increasingly popular style of legal pragmatism is "economic pragmatism," which is distinct
from both neoclassical and behavioral law and economics. See, e.g, RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003); Desautels-Stein, At War ivith the Eclectics, supra note 2, at
595-605,611-22.
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a legal pragmatism "freestanding" from the work of James, Dewey, and
company.
Before moving on to the other forms of legal pragmatism, the
connection between eclectic pragmatism and contemporary legal
consciousness deserves another word. After all, we might intuitively see a
connection between the "conflicting considerations" approach and eclectic
pragmatism, but what of neoformalism? How does eclectic pragmatism
ally with a style of jurisprudence which seems at first blush to be in
tension with the basic commitments of the everyday pragmatist?
In order to properly understand these questions, we need to distinguish
between the self-identified legal pragmatist as an individual agent, either
in the guise of a judge or administrator or whoever, and legal pragmatism
as a form of legal consciousness. In the first case, we can look to the
works of scholars like Cass Sunstein as representative of an idea about a
status-quo jurisprudence, based on an attraction to context and an
abhorrence towards grand theory and foundations. 100 The work of law
should be a law that works, solving problems through an appreciation of
economics, sociology, political science, and whatever other forms of
knowledge-production may help us steadily move forward in the
elaboration of a "better" law. In this sense, the eclectic pragmatist does not
seem readily susceptible to the dynamics of neoformalism and its
attachment to rights and right thinking.
When we recognize that eclectic pragmatism is also a sensibility, and
not merely a professional identity, this tension quickly fades. The average
judge, the average associate at a law firm, the average policy wonk, the
average "American," doesn't hold the same sorts of quasi-consequentialist

100. Here I am referring to Sustein's theory of "minimalism." Sunstein describes minimalism in
the following way: "Minimalists are skeptical of rights flindamentalism, certainly when the Court is
initially confronting difficult questions. They fear that expansive conceptions of rights may be
confounded by unanticipated situations. Nor do minimalists have much enthusiasm for the idea of
democratic primacy; they fear that a wholesale rejection of rights claims will prove embarrassing or
worse in the future. Minimalists prefer small steps over large ones.
To support that preference,
minimalists invoke several considerations. The initial point is pragmatic: as Chief Justice Roberts's
comments suggest, no consensus may be possible on a more ambitious ruling. ... There is an
independent point, closely connected with the argument for trimming. Insofar as they are shallow,
minimalist rulings show a kind of respect to those with competing commitments on issues of plinciple
and policy. If a ruling can command agreement from people with fundamentally different views, it
demonstrates respect to those people, and even shows them a degree of charity. To the extent that
judges have a degree of diversity, the respect that they show one another extends to their fellow
citizens as well. When judges embrace shallowness, minimalists seek to obtain some of the virtues of
the 'overlapping consensus' defended in accounts of political liberalism." Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming,
122 HARV L. REV 1049, 1081-83 (2009).
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commitments of a Sunstein or Farber.'' They are rather far more inclined
to use whatever mode of reasoning will be the most successful in
achieving their given ends. This is the mindset in which it becomes normal
to hear big-firm associates, and even partners, talk of using critical legal
studies, when it works. It doesn't matter what critical legal studies, or
behavioral law and economics, or public choice theory, or human rights
law, might actually mean in terms of its political stakes. The only thing
that matters for the eclectic pragmatist is that they select the mode of
reasoning, whether it falls within the langue of formalism or the langue of
functionalism, that wins. If it gets the client what he wants, use it. If it gets
a politician elected, do it. If it solves our problems, try it.
The notion that this form of legal pragmatism might constitute a
contemporary legal consciousness comes into view when we bring liberal
legalism back into the story. If classical legal consciousness was related to
classic liberalism, and social legal consciousness was related to modern
liberalism, where is liberalism in the legal consciousness that we have
today?
Eclectic pragmatism instructs us on the merits of having lost faith in
either the classic or modern styles of liberal legalism. We no longer
believe in the dominance of the will theory as the way in which to
understand the role of law in the constitution of society, and we also no
longer believe in the dominance of state interventionism as the universal
corrective. And in the light of eclectic pragmatism, this is a moral good. In
this view, faith in any particular liberal approach gets in the way of getting
what we want, and getting what we want is what matters. The eclectic
pragmatist has most assuredly lost faith in both classic liberalism and
modern liberalism, which accounts for why contemporary legal thought
consists in the transformedelements of CLT and the social, and not just a
blending of those elements. But here's the key: the eclectic pragmatist has
not lost faith in liberalism. Indeed, what appears to have shaped up is a
sort of "pragmatist liberal legalism" in which the jurist is completely
committed to the vocabulary of classic and modern liberals, but at the
same time denies the faith that classic and modern liberals had in the
rightness of their respective modes of legal reasoning. The eclectic
pragmatist also has faith, but it is a faith rooted in the rightness of
liberalism, but not in any one of its predominant modes.

101.

Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics, supranote 2, at 593-94.
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Legal pragmatism thus sustains the paradoxical alliance between
neoformalism and policy balancing. It keeps the two going-without
pragmatism, we might very well see a different form of legal
consciousness. If we weren't committed to a crass vision of "what works,"
something else would be necessary to justify the continuation of a much
maligned style of formalism. At the same time, it is eclectic pragmatism
that inoculates policy balancing from fatal critique. It is pragmatism that
makes it possible to say: "We do these things because they work, not
because they're right."
B. Law & Development in the Third Globalization
Just as the law and development movement in the middle years of the
20th century reflected the consciousness of social legal thought, so does
the contemporary style of law and development policy reflect the
pragmatist consciousness of contemporary legal thought. As discussed
below, the contemporary phase of the field tracks the bifurcated nature of
the third globalization's legal pragmatism, housing both orientations that
take neoformalism as a point of departure and orientations that take
neoformalism as merely one variable in a constellation of conflicting
considerations.
1. Neoliberalism and the Rule ofLaw
The emergence of neoformalism and neoliberalism in the last decades
of the 20th century was attended by a war cry: "The Rule of Law!" Of
course, at its most fundamental, the idea is hardly one over which
neoliberals hold a monopoly. Indeed, classic and modern liberalism share
a great deal of common ground with regard to a general conception of the
Rule of Law. 102 This conception has several elements.

102. For discussions of the "Rule of Law" in general see Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the
Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REv. 1 (2008); RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW (Gianluigi Palombella & Neil
Walker eds., 2009); Colloquium, The Rule of Law Papers, 43 INT'L LAW. 1 (2009); RULES OF LAW
AND LAWS OF RULING (Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann & Julia Eckert

eds., 2009);

BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW

(Erik G.

Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003); THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, THEORY AND CRITICISM (Pietro
Costa & Danilo Zolo eds., 2007); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY (2004); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Dark Side of the RelationshipBetween The Rule of Law and

Liberalism, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 516 (2008); Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of
Law " Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL,

supra note 3,

at 253; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER,

SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 48-58 (1976).
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First is the principle of legal autonomy.' 03 That is, liberal law must be
autonomous from the society that it is meant to govern, for if law is unable
to maintain a degree of independence from its subjects, the distinction
between law and politics collapses.1 0 4 At the same time, liberal law must
also be autonomous from any particular religious or moral code, since the
identification of law with morality would render useless the whole idea of
society being governed by a set of rules to which it has consented. 1 o5
Another way of putting this is that, in liberal society, it is essential that
rulers be constrained by something other than their own personal
worldviews; the law must be autonomous from personal morality, and
autonomous from personal politics.10 6 Legal autonomy must also be
institutionally viable-the Rule of Law cannot be applied and interpreted
by a political body, namely the legislature, and so a separation of powers
is necessary to inoculate the judiciary from the political nature of rulecreation and to set in motion the judicial nature of rule-ascertainment. 07
Due to the necessity of keeping rule-ascertainment autonomous from rulecreation, liberal law also requires the idea of legal reasoning to be
autonomous from other forms of reasoning, such as happens in politics,
economics, or religion.
A second aspect of liberal law is legislative generality.109 Liberal law
should not cater to the preferences of any particular group, but must
instead be couched in universal, neutral terms. 110 In this way, generality is
said to bring with it a sense of procedural fairness, as the motivating idea
is to make general prescriptions for the population without favoring

103. Most scholars seem attracted to an idea of "Relative autonomy". Among other things, classic
and modern liberals share a belief in the constitutive power of law. That is, liberalism holds as a
political prerequisite the possibility of a legal order which exists independently of the market, but is at
the same time capable of shaping the foundational materials of market society. Traditionally, liberals
have stressed the law's independence from economics and politics, and neglected the details of law's
background role in economic theory. The reason legal independence or autonomy has been understood
as a critical component of the liberal program, since this is the only way to guarantee that the
sovereign will exercise its power in a neutral and general way, constrained by preexisting norms and
prohibited from ruling on the basis of its own preferences or ideological outlook. For discussions of
relative autonomy, see Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the Relative
Autonomy' of the Law, 11 L. & Soc'y REV. 571 (1977); Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "Relative
Autonomy" ofLaiw, 19 CARDOzO L. REv. 1987, 1994 (1998).
104.
105.

MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 76-88 (2005).
UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY, supranote 102, at 83-103.

106. Waldron, supra note 102, at 6-7.
107.
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substantive conceptions of what it means to lead a good life.'" General
legislation must also be clear, public, and predictable, so that the general
population is easily able to understand and rely on a set of norms that will
guide their expectations as they compete in market society. 12
A third and related aspect of liberal law is the uniform interpretation
and application of the law through the courts.' Just as a violation of
legislative generality would undermine the liberal value of a free and equal
citizenry, so too would the persistence of judicial preferences in the
application of the law rob citizens of their right to have the law
administered equally and without regard to political dispositions.1 14
With respect to the rhetorical power of the Rule of Law ideal, consider
the contrasting works of Friedrich Hayek and Roberto Unger. Both agree
that liberal law requires a commitment to autonomy, generality, and
uniformity. They also agree that liberal law is substantively characterized
by a set of background rules, which are then offset by a set of
bureaucratized regulations, or foreground rules. With regard to the
evolution of these background rules over time, Hayek and Unger both
emphasize their connection with customary law, the relationship of custom
to the Rule of Law, and the liberal need for the constitution to safeguard
the Rule of Law from state interference.'" As Unger has said, "The
animating idea is the effort to make patent the hidden legal content of a
free political and economic order. This content consists in a system of
property and contract rights and in a system of public-law arrangements
and entitlements safeguarding the private order."' 16
Hayek explained that the Rule of Law, which he also called "rules of
just conduct," evolved because it was successful-it beat out other rules,

111. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1998); ROBERT
DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (2000).

112. Waldron, supra note 102, at 6-7.
113. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY, supranote 102, at 83-103.
114. Of course, there is a deep and wide disagreement about how these elements are actually
worked out in the liberal style of Rule of Law discourse, and it is unnecessary here to do more than
scratch the surface. The reason for this is that in the discussion that follows, most references to a Rule
of Law ideal emerge in the contexts of the classic and neoliberal images, and thankfully, both of these
entail a set of crisp ideas about what the Rule of Law should mean. The deep ambiguities that muddy
the water come in two other situations which this discussion primarily avoids: searching for a
definition of the Rule of Law in the context of modern liberalism, or searching for a definition in
abstracto.
115. Principally, I focus on Unger's KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975), LAW IN MODERN
SOCIETY, supra note 102, and WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?, supra note 16, and on
Hayek's THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944), THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960) and LAW,
LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, supranote 29.
116. UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?, supra note 16, at 41.
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or customs, because it made for better lives.'' It would be a mistake to
believe, however, that the adherents of these customs ever consciously
promulgated them, or may have even been able to articulate them.
Customs were, instead, manifested in the regularity of practice: "The
important point is that every man growing up in a given culture will find
in himself rules, or may discover that he acts in accordance with rulesand will similarly recognize the actions of others as conforming or not
conforming to various rules."" 8 What follows from this spontaneous and
organic conception of rules is the idea that they cannot be attributed to any
conscious, deliberate, human design. 119 For Hayek these rules of conduct
are therefore, by definition, pre-political, just as in the same way that the
growth of organic compounds or the arrangements of magnetic fields are
wholly natural.12 0 These customary rules form the core of the Rule of Law.
While the Rule of Law is the essence of the liberal legal order, Hayek
reminds that where foreground rules are necessarily distributive, the Rule
of Law is "independent of any common purpose," blindly and equally
applicable to all. 121 Real freedom, as a result, is therefore conditioned on a
choice of background rules (the Rule of Law) over foreground rules
(legislation), where the Rule of Law is understood as permissive and
enabling, and legislation is prohibitive and coercive.1 22 Hayek helpfully
concludes that everything he has discussed with regard to the rules of
conduct operating in the spontaneous order and the willy-nilly legislative
caprice of governmental organization, tracks exactly the distinction
between private and public law, respectively. 123 Also, and again, Hayek
says that with regard to constitutional law, its fame has been
misconceived. Constitutional law's job is simply to "secure the
maintenance of the law"124-meaning the common law of property and
contract. Unger underlines the point as well when he explains that, as a
first way of protecting the liberal principles of property and contract,
courts rely on interpretive methods to shift rules that have tended towards
distributive, non-neutral policies back towards the Rule of Law. 125 When
this is not enough, "[the back-up policing practice is constitutional
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invalidation, striking down those instances of redistribution through law
that cannot be preempted through improving interpretation."1 26
Hayek firmly believed that liberal law led to the most just kind of
society men could feasibly attain, and this justice flowed from the primal
waters of property and contract law. Finally abandoning the feudal road,
Hayek argued that the "decisive step" in humanity's progressive evolution
was the discovery of the bargain. 127 But the ability to consistently
determine what belonged to who, and how to trade one thing for another,
depended on the development of property and contract rules. 128 If this
never were to happen, ideas like "ownership" and "bargain" would never
have had any real meaning.' 29 Hayek argued that these new rules of
conduct were the mechanisms of coexistence, were definitively noncoercive, and had as their central function the creation of a society in
which people with different outlooks on life, with different values for
different products, could live together in peace. What was required was
a law that told no man what he ought to do, but could "tell each what he
can count upon, what material objects or services he can use for his
purposes, and what is the range of actions open to him."13 1 Though Hayek
imagined the private law as non-coercive and pre-political in a very strong
sense, he nevertheless did, like Locke before him, believe that the market
brought with it more than a sustainable peace (essential as that was), but a
just society as well. It was not that either of them thought that the moral
content of property and contract would generate any particular
constellation of social outcomes, but rather that it was the process of the
private law that was just.132 "In this respect what has been correctly said of
John Locke's view on the justice of competition, namely, that 'it is the
way in which competition is carried on, not its results, that count,' is
generally true of the liberal conception of justice, and of what justice can
achieve in a spontaneous order." 33
Though Unger and Hayek have substantially similar descriptions of the
liberal Rule of Law, they part ways when it comes to its evaluation. For
Hayek's neoliberalism, private law governance was the only way to
guarantee a maximum of freedom and equality. For Unger and similar
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critics, the abandonment of social organization to the private law is to
acquiesce in persistent and entrenched hierarchies and stark inequalities;134
is to embrace an institutional fetishism proclaiming the naturalness of one
set of legal, political, and economic arrangements;1 3 5 is to mask the
political choices embedded in the liberal style of property and contract
law, and the benefits these choices typically confer on the wealthy at the
expense of the poor; 1 is to indulge a fantasy in which the judiciary's job
of ascertaining the Rule of Law is any less subject to political and moral
capture than the legislature's job of rule creation; is to pretend that the
courts are somehow less arms of the state than other government
agencies.' 38 As Morris Cohen once wrote, "in actual life real freedom to
do anything, in art as in politics, depends upon acceptance of the rules of
our enterprise.
To follow Hayek down his road is also to mistakenly substitute the
notion of technical expertise in the administration of the Rule of Law for
the distributional nature of policy choice.140 In a recent essay attacking the
use of property rights as a background rule for economic development,
David Kennedy suggested that a Hayekian advocacy in favor of "clear and
strong property rights" fails to understand the highly disaggregated and
stratified nature of property law regimes that exist in the industrialized
states. 141 "Property in a market economy has no ideal form separate from
the warp and woof of social and economic struggle in that society. Before
'property rights' can be strong or weak, they must be allocated and
defined-a process which in every Western society has been inseparable
from struggles over political and social objectives." 1 42 In making this
argument plain, Kennedy cites several examples of contested choices over
different kinds of property regime from the choices to empower women or
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corporations to independently inherit and transfer property, to choices to
terminate the rights of serfs to the commons in favor of yeoman rights to
enclosed grazing lands, to choices about the allocation of water rights in
the American west, to choices over what should constitute "fair use" in the
context of intellectual property debates.143 In these situations and many
more, which set of answers will be "strong and clear"? In every case, the
condition of any given property regime will always bear the marks of the
political debates in which they were forged. "Consequently, property
rights are less a legal 'system' than a historical record of winners, losers
and social accommodation in economic and political struggles over a
nation's direction. In this sense, neo-liberal orthodoxy is wrong to suggest
that the establishment of property rights of a particular kind is a precondition to a market economy."144
Another typical problem associated with liberal property rights, and
also articulated in Kennedy's piece, is the critique of a determinate
relationship between public and private law. As Hayek made clear, the
liberal style rests on a strong sense in which property rights (and private
law more generally) preexist the regulatory law of the state. But when we
take Hayek seriously, and find that property and contract have no meaning
until backed with the coercive power of the state, little ground is left to
stand upon in which the Rule of Law is understood as somehow less an act
of state than some bureaucrat's administrative decision. As Kennedy
explains, "property rights are, in the end, only as strong as one's ability to
bring the state into play as their enforcer." 145 Hayek would be hard pressed
to disagree. But disagree he would with a third problem: "[I]t is simply
meaningless to say that property rights in general are 'strong' or 'clear'
without specifying just who ought to have a strong entitlement against
whom or for just whom the application of the state's enforcement power
ought to be clear and predictable in what circumstances."1 46 When it is
remembered that Property law creates rights and duties between people,
and not relationships between people and things, it is easier to focus on the
fact that strong rights entail strong duties, and the process of economic
development inevitably requires political choices about who gets those
rights, and who will be held to corresponding duties. As Unger put it,
"[T]he facilitative devices of contract and private law will be used by
those who, in a sense, are already organized. The organized can find in

143. Id.at 4-5.
144. Id.at 6.
145. Id.at 10.
146. Id at 12.
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their legally sanctioned association reinforcement for their pre-existing
advantage."l 47 The choice, as a consequence, is whether and where the
development expert wishes to facilitate opportunity for advantage-a
choice that cannot be avoided when establishing the background rules of
property and contract.
Hayek's Rule of Law is central to the neoliberal style in a way that it
was not for the modern style. To be sure, the modern style advocates the
benefits of an expansive legal system, but it is less concerned about a strict
relationship between a legal core called the Rule of Law and a body of
regulations threatening to "plan" or "intervene." In fact, the modern style
intentionally blurs this distinction. After the neoliberal revival, a crisp
image of property, contract, and constitutionalism replaced the distributive
functionalism and process-oriented jurisprudence of the prior
generation.-148
But it would be a mistake to assume that this shift represented a simple
substitution of "conservative" policies in exchange for "liberal" ones. The
forces pushing the new view of "Rule of Law" 49 and development came
at once from a burgeoning human rights movement on the one hand,150 and
the free marketers associated with the Washington Consensus on the
other.' 5 1 In both cases, the common effect was to produce a view of
economic development that required the establishment of private rights
guarded by an overarching constitutional order. The difference consisted
simply in which rights, and which order. Nevertheless, and despite this
confluence, the clear weight of law and development reform in this period

147.

UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?, supranote 16, at 17.

148. See generally David Kennedy, Political Choices and Development Common Sense, supra
note 57; Trubek, supra note 7.
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150. The case that is often thought of as the trigger for the human rights movement was decided in
1980, Filartiga v. Peha-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For a description of the case and its impact,
see Harold Koh, Filartiga v. Pefra -Irala: Judicial Internalization of the Customary InternationalLaw
Norm Against Torture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 45 (John Noyes et al. eds., 2007). For

discussion of the human rights in the development movement, see Roland Rich, The Right to
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sat in favor of private law over public. After Reagan and Thatcher, private
law ruled.152
The new view of law attended a new view of economics. The problem,
according to this view, had not been with market failure, but government
failure, i.e. the public sector had become overextended, led astray by the
allure of bad economics (big pushes, etc.), and was generally in the
business of creating economic distortions that had the effect of promoting
systemic inefficiencies. The thinking behind this reversal should be
familiar: monetarist policy, radiating out of its center at the University of
Chicago,' 53 regarded government regulation as naturally at odds with the
principles of freedom and justice, understood the primary role of
government to be a protector of property rights, believed in a strong
relationship between market rationality and the role of prices in mobilizing
and allocating resources, and sought the elimination of all barriers to free
trade, the privatization of industry, and the implementation of special
kinds of loans to the Third World trading cash for commitments to battle
inflation, corruption, rent-seeking, and so forth. 154

152. Among the most influential texts on the importance of the common law is Richard Posner's
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973). For critical responses, see Jules Coleman, Efficiency, Utility,

and Wealth Aavimization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980); Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of
Economic Analysis of Laiw, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1982) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981)). Elsewhere I have described the shift in normative discussion from the

one that took place at the time when writers like Posner, Coleman, and Ronald Dworkin were debating
the merits of the new law and economics, to the contemporary one: "Posner's Kantian adventures were
by no means the extent of the normative defense. Indeed, much more recently, Louis Kaplow and
Stephen Shavell have argued that the norm of personal welfare, as mediated by the efficient allocation
and production of social resources, should be the only principle with which the legal decision-maker
should be armed. In particular, Kaplow and Shavell have argued that (1) fairness considerations either
end up serving a welfare interest, or if they are altogether independent of a welfare criterion, they
systematically produce undesirable social consequences; (2) fairness considerations are at best
subsidiary to welfare considerations and are at worst in conflict with human welfare, and as a
consequence; (3) deontic preferences for justice or fairness should be abandoned in favor of efficient
allocations of goods that best approximate the needs of social welfare.
This approach to a normative defense of the law and economics approach is quite different than
the round of arguments made in the 1980s. Kaplow and Shavell presume that there is something
intuitively desirable about efficiency as a first principle, and once it is claimed that fairness
considerations violate that first principle, the burden falls on deontologists to show how fairness can,
in fact, serve efficient ends. The big difference between the two debates is that what was once
understood as an issue for actual debate in terms of justification and legitimation (i.e., whether
efficiency and wealth-maximization could be normatively defended on moral grounds), now happily
operates as the default position where the burden is on non-welfare considerations to show how they
do not threaten social welfare" Desautels-Stein, At War iwith the Eclectics, supra note 2, at 603.
153. For history on the Chicago School, see STEVEN MEDEMA, THE HESITANT HAND 160-96
(2009). For a critical review, see DAVID HARVERY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2007).

154. One of the figures commonly associated with the neoliberal shift is Anne Krueger, who at
times held high positions at both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Krueger
helped consolidate the idea that the major problems in development economics had centered on
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Some neoliberal stylists believed that by using law and politics-and
an enormous amount of political pressure via the World Bank and IMFdeveloped countries could force open the borders of the Third World;
structure its internal markets through the deployment of Western-style
bank systems, insurance plans, and commercial, corporate, intellectual
property, and securities law; and pry domestic producers off of their statesponsored dependencies. Local industry would be forced to compete, and
ultimately thrive.' 55 The keener among them, like Hernando de Soto, also
knew that all of these efforts were, in geological terms, secondary. 5 In his
influential work THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, de Soto asked what could be
made of the enormous failure of the developing world to modernize? The
"mystery" could be explained away in two words: property rights. "Why
has the genesis of capital become such a mystery? Why have the rich
nations of the world, so quick with their economic advice, not explained
how indispensable formal property is to capital formation?"1' The answer
was that for too long, people had looked at houses or lakes as natural
things, and not as commodities. For too long, people had not taken the
imaginative step of seeing a house or a lake as energy waiting to be
tapped, waiting to be turned into a value. 5 1
After extensive research throughout the developing world, de Soto was
convinced that the problem of development was centered precisely here, in
the problem of property rights. The world was ready for "take-off," but it
was law, or rather the lack thereof, that kept most of the world in poverty.
It wasn't that people didn't have property, but that they did not have their
property recorded in the legal system. If one's house is not properly
recorded, de Soto explained, that house could not then take on its critical
function as a capital asset. And without capital, development would
remain a dream. As de Soto suggested:
In the West, this formal property system begins to process assets
into capital by describing and organizing the most economically and

government failures, and not failures in the market. Particularly, the problem with large state
apparatuses was that they tended to create windfalls of unearned income in the private sector,
facilitating the weakening of industry and its dependence on governmental subsidies. This is what
became known as a "rent-seeking society." See ANNE KRUEGER, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1993).

155. For discussion of conditionality and structural adjustment, see CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note
45, at 555-90.
156. Hernando de Soto has been an especially influential voice in the literature on economic
development. Among the personalities chosing to voice their high praise of his work, THE MYSTERY
OF CAPITAL (2000), were Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Coase, and Milton Friedman.
157. Id. at 48.
158. Id. at 44.
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socially useful aspects about assets, preserving this information in a
recording system-as insertions in a written ledger or a blip on a
computer disk-and then embodying them in a title. A set of
detailed and precise legal rules governs this entire process.

. .

. They

capture and organize the potential value of an asset and so allow us
to control it. Property is the realm where we identify and explore
assets, combine them, and link them to other assets. The formal
property system is capital's hydroelectric plant. This is the place
where capital is born. 159
2. NeoliberalConstitutionalism
In the classic liberal style of framing the relation between state and
market, property and contract rights are viewed as constitutive of market
society. Without a properly legalized system of property and contract,
markets can't happen. As Locke explained in his Second Treatise,
however, private law wasn't enough to make the market. What was also
needed was a constitutional government, the chief end of which was the
protection of property rights from both private infringement and arbitrary
interference on the part of the state. Consequently, classic liberal legalism
demands a strong form of property and contract rights and a constitutional
guarantee for the maintenance of those rights.1"o While liberal legalism in
the neoliberal mode doesn't involve as crude a sense about
constitutionalism, Hayek makes it clear enough that Locke's idea was
basically correct.
In the context of law and development, the constitutional layer is
arguably provided by the involvement of international financial
institutions. As Danny Nicol has suggested,
[T]he transnational constitution can be perceived as a kind of
insurance policy guaranteeing the preservation of a particular
variety of capitalism. Its object is to lock in place a system of
privitisation and commercial liberty, so that things will not change
very much when new governments are elected. Thus the new
constitutional law serves to guard against the possibility that future
governments might abandon the creed of private enterprise.161

159. Id. at 46-47.
160. For a full discussion, see DANNY NICOL, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CAPITALISM
(2010); Desautels-Stein, LiberalLegalism and the Tiwo State Action Doctrines, supra note 1.
161.

NICOL, supra note 160, at 19.
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For some, this insurance policy is available for inspection in the work of
the WTO. While Nicol and others are clearly opposed to the neoliberal
emphasis on property rights complemented by the emerging idea that
international law should provide a constitutional scheme for the guarantee
of free competition in the global economy, others, like Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, view this idea in a more favorable light.
The perspective that underlines Petersmann's approach is that there is
an ideological alliance between the agents of international human rights
law and trade law that has long gone unnoticed.162 Petersmann has argued
that "in order to [be] democratically acceptable, global integration law
(e.g. in the WTO) must pursue not only 'economic efficiency' but also
'democratic legitimacy' and 'social justice' as defined by human
rights ." This perception is part of a larger project of Petersmann's, in
which he has suggested that the WTO should constitutionalize along the
lines of the European Union and integrate human rights law with the
machinery of free trade and commerce. 164 The idea is to essentially marry
human rights and market freedoms in a way so as to create a new liberal
bargain of pre-commitments: domestic entities will give up their
interventionist rights in good faith on the belief that the upper-level
constitutional commitments to economic rights will be for the greatest
benefit. This scheme is not only justified by economic thinking, but by the
moral, democratic, and constitutional legitimacy of human rights law as
well.
According to Petersmann, the EU offers the world-and especially the
WTO-an illuminating example of how human rights and market
freedoms are inherently dependent on one another, and how they should
be fused. The lessons from European integration for the WTO flow from
what Petersmann calls the functional theory of integration: "the view that
economic market integration can progressively promote peaceful
cooperation and the rule of law beyond economic areas, thereby enabling
more comprehensive and more effective protection of human rights than

162. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. INT L ECON. L. 19
(2000); see also Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact'for Integrating
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations:Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR.
J. INTL L. 621 (2002); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1991).

163.

Petersmann, Global Compact, supranote 162, at 624.
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For a thorough discussion on constiutionalizing
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Constitutionalization' of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of
ConstitutionalDevelopment in InternationalTrade, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 39 (2001).
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has been possible in traditional state-centred international law."' 65 The
benefits of this integration work not only for human rights, but also the
establishment of human rights like the rights to property and contract that
go a long way towards nourishing the foundations for successful
markets.166 "Wherever freedom and property rights are protected,
individuals start investing, producing and exchanging goods, services and
-,,167
income.
These lessons point Petersmann to the conclusion that "UN human
rights law and WTO rules offer mutually beneficial synergies for
rendering human rights and the social functions and democratic legitimacy
of the emerging global integration law more effective."1 68 The way
forward is to realize a "Global Compact," initiated by the United Nations,
which would demand of all international organizations a binding
cognizance of "human rights, the rule of law, democracy and 'good
governance."' 69 To this extent, the WTO appellate body would come to
"protect human rights in the trade policy area."170
3. Conflicting Considerationsat the World Bank
Just as consensus emerged in the late 1970s and '80s that the first wave
of development economics had been a failure, so did neoliberal practice
come under similar scrutiny in the years around the turn of the Twenty
First Century. 7 1 Unlike prior moments in the movement, however, faith in
one style of law and economics failed to transfer to some better rival.
Instead, the current phase of thinking has accepted, again, that markets
cannot supply the conditions of economic success. Regulation is
important, too, though, the contemporary expert will admit, markets are

165. Petersmann, Global Compact, supranote 162, at 631.
166. Id. at 627-32. Petersmann is also making reference to Mary Robinson's work, Making the
Global Economy Work for Human Rights, in THE ROLE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Gary Sampson ed., 2001).

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Petersmann, Global Compact, supra note 162, at 629.
Id. at 632.
Id at 642.
Id.
Writing a bit ahead of the curve, Joseph Stiglitz called this transition "new development

economics." Joseph Stiglitz, The Newt Development Economics, 14 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 257

(1986). In this posture, the neoliberal reaction against the notion of market failures has been diluted:
"market failures, particularly those related to imperfect and costly information, may provide insights
into why the LDCs have a lower level of income and why so many find it difficult to maintain existing
current differentials, let alone catch up . . . . The kinds of market failures with which I have been
concerned are markedly different from those that were the focus of attention some two decades ago."
Joseph Stiglitz, Markets, Market Failures, and Developmentt, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 197, 201 (1989); see
also JOSEPH STIGLTIZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? (1994).
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also key. Property rights are essential, but so is democracy. Free trade is a
major engine of growth, but tariffs can be critical in many areas. There are
certain principles, such as competition, which consistently generate the
best results, but it must also be admitted that there is no single plan, and
that every region may call for a special solution. Development
practitioners have returned to the idea that "development" must mean
something other than efficient business practice, and that it should include
an idea of development as freedom.' 72 Thankfully, promotion of the Rule
of Law bestows blessings on both those that are in pursuit of liberal
democracy and the liberal market. Taken together, few practitioners today
have kept faith with either the modern or neoliberal styles of law and
economics, and have turned instead to a crude pragmatism.173 The way
forward, many today would agree, lies in the balancing of these often
conflicting considerations.17 4
Among the most influential locations for work on Rule of Law
development is the World Bank, which at the Bank has been big business.
Over the past decade, the Bank has published several major reports
outlining its financial activities related to the Rule of Law, and the
rationale for its commitment.' Among these is the International Financial
Corporation's annual report, Doing Business, the purpose of which is to
''provide an objective basis for understanding and improving the
regulatory environment for business."176 The reasoning behind the project
is that emerging industries in the developing world require a set of good
rules and institutional arrangements, which necessarily shape the
background of successful economic activity. These "good" rules include
"rules that establish and clarify property rights and reduce the costs of
resolving disputes, rules that increase the predictability of economic
interactions and rules that provide contractual partners with core
protections against abuse."' 1 The project's method is to track the
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175.

WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2010 (2009).

176. Id. at v.
177. Id.

20121

DEVELOPMENT & THE PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH

41

operation of such rules through the quantification of ten indicators,
including (1) starting a business, (2) dealing with construction permits,
(3) employing workers, (4) registering property, (5) getting credit,
(6) protecting investors, (7) paying taxes, (8) trading across borders,
(9) enforcing contracts, and (10) closing a business.' 8 As a reflection of
its modest legal pragmatism, the project is neither focused on more or less
regulation as necessarily an indicator of economic growth or inefficient
rent-seeking: "some Doing Business indicators give a higher score for
more regulation, such as stricter disclosure requirements in related-party
transactions. Some give a higher score for a simplified way of
implementing existing regulation, such as completing business start-up
formalities in a one-stop shop.""'9 Similarly, the project has discarded the
idea that there is a single, linear route to developmental progress. Quoting
Colombia's minister of commerce, the 2010 report explains that economic
development is "not like baking a cake.

. .

. But we can take certain things,

certain key lessons, and apply those lessons and see how they work in our
environment."' 80

In 2010, the Doing Business report suggested that certain reforms had
begun to crystallize.'' As a threshold matter, the report found that those
countries most successful in instituting regulatory reform were those
committed to a large-scale increase in the competitiveness of their local
firms. This may sound tautological, but the report goes on to say that the
most successful states, like Singapore and China, continue to "push
forward and stay proactive" by following de Soto's recommendations to
make business simpler and easier to begin. Another common element of
success is comprehensiveness: "Over the past 5 years Colombia, Egypt,
Georgia, FYR Macedonia, Mauritius and Rwanda each implemented at
least 19 reforms.

. .

. This broad approach increases the chances of success

and impact."' 8 2 This "comprehensive" approach includes a lowering of the
cost of entry for foreign competitors through free trade. 83 Successful
reformers are also "inclusive," meaning that they are eager to establish
private-public partnerships and gravitate towards long-term plans. 184
Another Bank project relevant to the development of the Rule of Law
is its compendium of all Bank financed activities in "justice reform,"
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Initiatives in Justice Reform.'8 5 The rationale for the Bank's commitment

to the Rule of Law is stated at the beginning of the report: The Bank's
mission is to reduce worldwide poverty, and the Rule of Law is seen as a
"fundamental element of economic development and poverty
reduction."' 8 6 The Rule of Law is both an "end in itself, but also a means
of facilitating the achievement of other development objectives."18 7 '"This
focus reflects an understanding by the Bank and its member countries that
the rule of law and justice are crucial to both growth and equity in
countries throughout the world."188 The Bank's belief in the law's
constitutive power is rooted in data. Initiatives cites confirming statistics
from the Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment indicators,
the World Bank Institute's governance indicators, the Doing Business
indicators mentioned above, and the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey, as all supporting the view that law reform is a
necessary ingredient in establishing more efficient business practices.' 8 9
Initiatives also cites the Rule of Law as an important economic aid insofar
as corruption is a major obstacle to the development of market society. 190
"Good Governance" are the watchwords. 191
Another leading source of thinking about Rule of Law development is
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and in particular, its
Vice President for Studies, Thomas Carothers. In a recent follow-up to his
influential "The Rule of Law Revival," 1 92 Carothers criticizes
intergovernmental institutions and domestic aid agencies for taking too
soft a view of what the Rule of Law actually requires in its
implementation.193 In Carothers' view, Rule of Law advocates, which he
believes to be almost everybody, everywhere, tend to make several kinds
of mistakes. First, the widespread consensus on the political and economic
benefits of Rule of Law development is an empty one. Even if it is
assumed that leaders are serious about implementing a legal development

185. WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009 (2008). The 2009 Initiatives report
outlines three central themes ofjustice reform. First is "court management and performance." Second
is "access to justice," which is, as it sounds, the effort to make courts more accessible to the people.
Third is "legal information and education." Id. at 5.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2-3.
190. Id. at 3.
191.

For discussion, see JAMES THUO GHATTI, WAR, COMMERCE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

(2010).
192. Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Lawt Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (1998).
193. Carothers, The Rule of Law Temptations, supranote 151, at 51-53.
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strategy, which is often a poor assumption, it must be recognized that
advocates often have wildly different ideas about just which kinds of rules
they want to transplant and entrench. 194 Perhaps they are classic liberal
property rights; perhaps they are rights enumerated in the United Nations
Declaration on Minority Rights. The fact of this disparity empties much of
the meaning of a "consensus" about the Rule of Law. Second, Carothers
identifies a trend by "authoritarian" government to depoliticize their Rule
of Law commitments.' 95 Referring to the public law constitutionalism of
the 1990s, Carothers pointed out how Rule of Law projects converged
with democratic reform projects, producing an idea of law with
substantive, welfarist commitments. More recently, advocacy for the Rule
of Law from countries like Russia and China have delinked the Rule of
Law, and especially the idea of "rights," from democratic reform. The
upshot is a Rule of Law bereft of its politically desirable spillover
effects.196 A third mistake that Carothers sees gaining in prevalence is the
idea that the Rule of Law can be grown organically if only certain
institutional elements are put in place. 197 The idea that a liberal legal
system can flower after a little soil and sunlight are added, Carothers
explained, was debunked long ago, only to be revived again in the twentyfirst century. 98 If Rule of Law development is to succeed, these and other
mistakes need to be addressed. 199

194. Id.
195. Id. at 53-54.
196. Id
197. Id. at 55-59.
198. Id
199. Carothers' critiques might resemble the arguments surveyed in Part 11in association with
what I termed a "critical" style. To be sure, Carothers' and his colleagues' work is certainly critical,
but it is more appropriately situated amidst the pragmatism of a post-neoliberal style than the antiliberalism of critical theory. For example, Carothers emphasizes the variability of Rule of Law work,
but appears to assume that "liberal" and "conservative" ideas about the Rule of Law are determinate.
He emphasizes the political nature of Rule of Law work, but cabins political effects to the public
sector, lamenting the loss of democratic development while neglecting the distributional effects of a
classic liberal common law regime. He points out that the Rule of Law cannot have an organic,
evolutionary quality about it, but his text still seems constrained by a set of disappointments that have
produced a vision of law funneled by what Unger has called the convergence thesis: due to the steady
march of institutional progress (and decline), we face a very limited set of choices about what law
might become. Whatever the case may ultimately be, and whether Carnegie scholars are better
understood as eclectic pragmatists or anti-liberal critics, the fact is that in the contemporary period of
thinking about the role of law in economic development, most experts have lost faith in either the
classic or modern liberal styles of imaging the proper balance between state and market action. The
same holds true for constitutional scholars thinking about the same question in the context of
constitutional state action doctrine.
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C. The ExperimentalPath
In the discussion above, legal pragmatism was introduced as a way of
understanding the relationship between the neoformalist and balancing
tendencies that Duncan Kennedy has attributed to contemporary legal
thought. In particular, the culprit was a distinct breed known as "eclectic
pragmatism." In addition to eclectics, however, there are two other forms
of legal pragmatism on the contemporary scene, economic pragmatism and
experimental pragmatism. I will pass over economic pragmatism for the
sake of space, but do wish to note that it is a style of pragmatism that
places a tremendous amount of weight on the norm of allocative efficiency
while at the same time avoiding being just another name for neoclassical
law and economics. The champion of this style is Richard Posner. The
focus of this section, however, is experimentalism, and it takes a recent
text from William Simon and Charles Sabel as representative. The relevant
questions are (1) whether experimental pragmatism is indigenous to
contemporary legal thought or better understood as a revival of modern
liberalism, and (2) whether experimental pragmatism offers anything
200
worthwhile in the context of development economics.
In their most recent work on the topic, Sabel and Simon situate
experimental pragmatists against two rival styles of law and policy
work.201 On one side is the well-known "minimalism" of Sunstein &
Associates202 and on the other is what Sabel and Simon call the "command

200. For the purposes of this discussion, I am limiting the coverage here to Sabel & Simon,
Minimalism and Experimentalism, supra note 6, and Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights,
supra note 6.
201. "Experimental Pragmatism" seems like a label that is perfectly consistent with Sabel and
Simon's usage here. My suspicion is that their main complaint would be that the label is redundant
since all pragmatism is experimentalist. My response there would simply be to the abundance of work
done by self-identified pragmatists that so clearly does not embody the kind of experimentalism they
are espousing. This may very well boil down into what is "really" pragmatism and what is not, replaying the same debates that emerged after Peirce, Dewey, and James claimed that the term was being
misused. My intention here is most certainly not to claim that Sunstein is actually and truly a
pragmatist. It is rather that scholars like Sunstein self-identify with the term, and have enough in
common with a rough and vernacular sense of pragmatism to justify calling them pragmatists as such.
What is necessary, however, in the process of diluting the name "pragmatism" is to make sure that we
carefully distinguish its strains, since they at least claim to be different creatures. There is a very large
literature here. Sample works include Amy J Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests,
Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 503 (2008); Charles Sabel & Michael Dorf, A Constitution
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Charles Sabel and William Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Laii Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004);
Symposium, Symposium on New Governance, 2010 WiS. L. REV. 227.
202. See, e.g., CASS SUNSEMN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE (2008); Christine Jolls, Cass R.

Susnein & Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471
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and control" model of administration.203 Sunstein's minimalism is a stock
example of the eclectic brand of contemporary legal pragmatism, and I
will use "minimalism" and "eclecticism" interchangeably. While Sunstein
seems to, occasionally, write more like an economic pragmatist than an
eclectic pragmatist, regardless of where we put him there seems little
doubt that he is deploying a contemporary form of legal pragmatism that is
not experimental pragmatism. The command and control model, against
which Sabel and Simon contrast both minimalism and experimentalism, is
similar to the modern liberalism of Duncan Kennedy's period of social
legal thought. Thus, I use "command and control," "modern liberalism,"
and "social legal thought" interchangeably.
For Sabel and Simon, minimalism is a new style of administration
forged in the context of contemporary legal thought as a corrective for the
failures of the mid-century welfare state.204 Though they do take
minimalism as heavily focused on the neoclassical conception of
efficiency analysis and the advantages of market simulation, Sabel and
Simon do not equate it either with the neoliberal apparatus that emerged in
the 1980s. Minimalism stands for something other than the free-market
orientation of neoliberalism or the "command and control" ethos of
modern liberalism, trying to take the good from both and shuffling their
insights as needed.20 5 Minimalism is skeptical about both the wisdom of
leaving too much power and discretion to clearly irrational market actors,
but also leaving too much discretion to regulators who are clearly subject
to capture. Markets fail, governments fail, and minimalism is set to offer a
balanced approach to governance that understands both the strengths and
weaknesses of the modern and neoliberal styles. 206 Without transcending
either, it recombines both in an attraction to the status quo, "static
efficiency," more of a market-based approach to welfare, and more of a
government-based approach to nudging market choices in the "right"
direction.

(1998).
203.
204.
205.
206.

Sabel & Simon, Mininalism and Experimentalism, supra note 6 at 54.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 56-60.
Id. at 60-68.
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1. The Basics
Sabel and Simon situate experimental pragmatism along two
dimensions, "Regulation" and "Social Welfare," which might grossly be
characterized as proxies for the "form" and "substance" of
experimentalism, respectively. In contrast to the minimalist habit of using
efficiency as a chief norm in the crafting of regulatory regimes,
experimental pragmatists are keener on regimes guided by a premium on
reliability. In the literature on management theory, reliability is a term of
art, involving an administrative outlook where the hope is for managers
and workers to operate in an atmosphere where learning and adaptation to
changing circumstances is constantly fostered. Conceivably inefficient or
nonoptimal eventualities are regarded as opportunities for growth, and the
emergence of problem areas or defects are absorbed into a perpetual
process of reassessment and reappraisal.
Sabel and Simon appropriately recognize that some might counter that
reliability concerns are simply concerns of a more broadly conceived idea
about efficiency. But as Sabel and Simon explain, there does seem to be a
real tension between experimentalist techniques and efficiency techniques
to the extent that the economic pragmatist will be preoccupied with strong
market signals like price, where the experimental pragmatist is looking at
a broad spectrum of signals, including those that are weak, subtle, and
deserve on-the-spot complex discretion. If too much attention is paid to
price, the focus on efficiency can undermine a regulatory framework of
reliability. For the efficiency-minded, cost-benefit analysis and regimes
that create mock-markets, like tradable emission programs, the main driver
is a static assessment of price. Instead of a default openness to a host of
varying sorts of signals and norms, the efficiency paradigm generates a
tunnel vision for simplicity and short-term costs, which Sabel and Simon
suggest is ultimately counterproductive. Experimental pragmatists believe
that our broadly defined goals, whatever they might be, will best be served
though complex responses with a view for the long-run, and not the
reverse.
As we saw in the work of Lasswell and McDougal, this kind of big
picture view is explicitly rooted in John Dewey's pragmatism. They write:
Experimentalism takes its name from John Dewey's political
philosophy, which aims to precisely accommodate the continuous
change and variation that we see as the most pervasive challenge of
current public problems. Policies should be "experimental in the
sense that they will be entertained subject to constant and wellequipped observation of the consequences they entail when acted
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upon, and subject to ready and flexible revision in the light of
observed consequences."207
Sabel and Simon understand this prime directive to involve a perspective
that, at bottom, rejects the idea that regulation works best through the
articulation of clear goals and the aggressive implementation of those
goals. The focus instead is on Dewey's notion of inquiry: the experimental
pragmatist is not too worried about precisely defined goals precisely
because our goals only come into focus in the actual process of doing, and
not before the doing has been done. It's just a mistake to set out a goal of
optimizing a particular industry since the notion of optimizing may very
well fool the regulator into chasing chimerical ideas instead of realizing, in
the day-to-day, the intertwined twists and turns of crisis and victory. Sabel
and Simon write: "In the realm of uncertainty, policy aims cannot be
extensively defined in advance of implementation; they have to be
discovered in the course of problem solving." 208
For the experimental pragmatist, following Dewey, the first lesson
requires the establishment of a very broad framework goal, but a goal that
must be open to constant revision. That is, the goal should be allowed to
change after we come to understand the goal as it seems to present itself in
the march of the routine. Next, our policymaker or legal analyst at the
center will want to devolve as much discretion as possible to local actors,
since it's in the local that the routine is most clearly understood. The local
actors produce, record, compile, and report results as regularly as possible
back to the center, and together the local actors and the administrators at
the center coordinate and evaluate. The framework goals themselves are
periodically evaluated in light of the process, helping dissolve the
distinction between the initial "value" and the "facts" to which the value
are ostensibly applied-a distinction key to the work of economic
pragmatists.
In the context of regulation, Sabel and Simon suggest that this
approach involves a structural design in which all the players, whether
public or private, whether at the center or periphery, are induced into a
culture of self-reporting and self-critique which will excel in the on-going
work of getting done what we want to get done that is absent in the
mainstream.209 Another advantage is that it avoids the critique of the

207. Sabel & Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism, supra note 6, at 78 (quoting JOHN
DEwEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 203 (1927)).

208. Id. at 56.
209. Id. at 83-89.
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welfare state which pointed to the inefficiency of the bureaucrat,
ultimately unable to get her hands on the information relevant to the
deployment of her apparent expertise. She could never know the market as
well as the market knew itself. In contrast, the experimentalist lives in a
sea of data-it just keeps on flowing in, flowing out, frothing about: the
local is on a par with the center here, as opposed to the old idea of the
interventionist state .210

In the context of social welfare, Sabel and Simon push the conversation
away from the form of rule-making and towards its content.211 The
minimalist apparatus of experimental pragmatism will be helpful in certain
issue areas, Sabel and Simon suggest, "[b]ut the approach seems
implausible or question begging with respect to many of the most
important problems . 1 2 The crux of the assertion is that eclectic
pragmatists have failed to adequately take stock of the basic social
changes in the playing field over the last half-century. In order to properly
figure out the role of government in the distribution of wealth and
resources (if that's even the right question), experimentalists are in tune
with the realities of 21st century social structures in ways that minimalists
are not.
The reasons for this are plain. The minimalist approach to social
welfare involves the same approach as it did to regulation: it is eclectic,
and based on a scheme of constantly recombining the assumptions of
modern liberals and neoliberals. The minimalist toolkit, as it were, ends
around 1980. To be sure, the minimalist approach of eclectic pragmatists
represents an alternative to the command and control model of modern
liberalism, as well as the libertarian feel of the Washington Consensus, but
what is new about it is the eclectic mixing of the ideas-not the arrival of
a new image of market-state relations.
According to Sabel and Simon, the substantive proposals of
experimental pragmatists with regard to the proper role of market and state
are not dated to the 1980s, but not because a new idea about political
economy has emerged. If this were the case, it might be an example of the
old-fashioned distinction between fact and value, goal and
implementation. Instead, experimental pragmatists are current in a way
that eclectics are not because eclectic pragmatists have sought to adapt the
assumptions of the New Deal and the Washington Consensus to the
present, instead of leaving those assumptions behind in favor of finding

210. Id.
211. Id. at 89-93.
212. Id. at 69.
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our answers in the real world of problem-solving. For example, Sabel and
Simon explain how the basic points of departure for New Deal thinking
involved an architecture of social insurance built around tax and transfer
cash distributions and framed in terms of market-labor relationshipS. 2 13
The idea was to target the everyman-an able-bodied English-speaking
white male with a traditional nuclear family tracked into a job in which
he'd stay for forty years. Instead of grasping the fundamental changes in
society with respect to what kinds of people are now able to work, where
they work, in what languages they work, and so on, Sabel and Simon
argue that minimalists have "sought to preserve the New Deal emphasis on
standardized, rule-defined cash benefits while broadening the scope of
both the social insurance and public assistance programs." 214 Minimalists,
on this view, are behind the times.
In order to make law more functional and better attuned to social
needs, experimental pragmatists are eager to do away with presumptions
from the past. The policy approach of the experimentalist should be on the
lookout for changing trends and incorporate a close-up focus on "highly
individuated planning, pervasive policy measurement, and efforts to
aggregate and disseminate information about effective practices." 215 The
mechanism, as already stated, is public participation. In a way that
distances itself from the pessimism of behavioral economics and
resembles the literature on deliberative democracy, experimental
pragmatists seek out operational plans in which local communities are
leading the way in figuring out what is working out through public
sharing, thinking, and critiquing. These local efforts need to be
harmonized through a central system, but instead of the center giving the
periphery a set of rules about the role of the state in the market, local
groups should be always thinking about what is working best, for whom,
and where.
2. Experimentalism Considered
So where does Sabel and Simon's discussion fit into Duncan
Kennedy's map of American Legal Thought? As I have previously argued,
minimalism is a stock example of eclectic pragmatism, which is a
motivating property in the "Third Globalization" of contemporary legal
thought. Sabel and Simon would likely agree that minimalism is a

213. Id. at 69-70.
214. Id. at 70.
215. Id. at 89.
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contemporary posture, since they expressly articulate it as a current
alternative to the command and control style of modern liberalism.
Similarly, if they were to accept the premises of the Three Globalizations
story, they would also accept the idea that experimental pragmatism fits in
the contemporary mode, given that they see experimentalism as the other
current alternative.
Just being an alternative to modern liberalism, however, is not enough
to merit a place on Kennedy's map. To geth there, we need to see some
combination of neoformalism and a balancing approach. As I have argued
elsewhere, eclectic pragmatism, including Sunstein's version of it, does
seem to capture a sensibility in which the jurist or policy expert is
encouraged to shift between form and function, truth and consequence, in
whatever way appears to fit the current need. What is new here is the
accepted nature of the eclecticism-where at one point we may have
identified a dominant faith in an individual will theory, or an expert
bureaucracy, we now have faith only in the mantra of "doing what works."
While this may be a fair description of the minimalism in Sabel and
Simon's article, does it also capture experimentalism? Are experimental
pragmatists similarly committed to a consequentialist view of
neoformalist/balancing techniques? And if so, what distinguishes them
from the eclectics?
Of course, an articulation of just what it is that distinguishes
experimentalists from eclectics was the whole point of Sabel and Simon's
article. To be sure, there can be no doubt that there are real and meaningful
differences here, and if it were put to a vote between the two I would
certainly be a card-carrying member of the experimentalist party. But
despite the operational contrasts, experimentalism and eclecticism seem
anchored in a broadly similar orientation that becomes more and more
clear when we take the birds-eye view. Consider the following.
First, Sabel and Simon appear intent on presenting experimentalism as
an administrative style that has already been planted. It's not a utopian
vision of a world yet to be-in fact, they argue that there has been "a
fundamental policy reorientation along experimentalist lines in the United
States, the European Union, and elsewhere since the 1990s.... Some of
the Obama Administration's most important initiatives, including the Food
Safety Modernization Act and the Race to the Top education program, can
only be understood in experimentalist terms."216 Indeed, there is a growing
list of examples of experimentalist work in the world to which Sabel and

216. Id. at 55-56.
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Simon are supplementing, not starting from scratch. From Toyota to the
US Navy, EPA's Project Excel to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
developments in child welfare reform to information trading at the WTO,
experimentalist approaches seem everywhere. 2' Of course, Sabel and
Simon don't want to go too far, and they are sure to remind that
experimentalism is in its infancy. It's young and unproven, but operating
in the here and now.
It is in this sense that minimalism and experimentalism therefore share
a common ground in that they are both a part of the contemporary
landscape-they are both practical, applicable modes of administration in
the second decade of the 21st century. Consequently, as experimental
approaches become more prevalent, they will likely take more of the
blame going round, of which there is plenty to share. If this is right, and
experimentalism is a meaningful aspect of contemporary legal thought,
then an initial complaint might hold that Kennedy's picture of the Third
Globalization is incomplete. If the Third Globalization is a confluence of
neoformalist techniques and balancing approaches, and experimentalism is
something else, is the map wrong?
I don't think that it is, and this leads to a second point about the
common ground upon which eclectics and experimentalists are working.
Sabel and Simon hammer home the idea that experimentalism is better
than eclecticism, and in the context of minimalist style of regulation their
chief complaint is that minimalism just doesn't work. They take efficiency
as the grundnorm in play, and show how in case after case a singular focus
on efficiency, optimal performance, and the techniques that make good on
those norms (like cost-benefit analysis and cap-and-trade) are poor
performers when it comes to actually doing what the regulations hope to
do. Sabel and Simon explain how efficiency concerns undermine the
fruitfulness of new learning opportunities218 and sacrifice better results for
quicker results, 2 19 while cost-benefit analysis persistently gets the
measurements of the costs and the benefits all wrong, or puts too much
emphasis on centralized decision-making procedures unaccompanied by
local assessments.220 Like cost-benefit analysis, Sabel and Simon see
problems with cap-and-trade also involving workability. 2 2 1 These
problems, however, are problems at the margins. Sabel and Simon admit

217.
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219.
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221.

Id. at 83-89.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 66-69.
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that cost-benefit analysis and cap-and-trade techniques are valuable, and
efficiency is a truly great idea, but they're just not as valuable as eclectics
would like to think.
The upshot here is that the experimentalist critique of eclectic
proposals flows out of a set of premises shared by the eclectics. In fact,
Sabel and Simon's critique appears to portray an eclecticism in itself,
chiding minimalists for being too preoccupied with a single normefficiency-at the expense of other norms which might also be valuable, if
not more so. Indeed, as discussed above, a strong sense of eclectic
pragmatism avoids any singular faith in a given approach, and to the
extent minimalism really is in orbit around one vision of the market, this
would suggest a more appropriate labeling of economic pragmatism, if not
the neoliberalism of the Chicago School. Experimentalism, on the other
hand, is safely situated in the Third Globalization given its attraction to a
bevy of norms, including efficiency, at least in the context of this one text.
Remember, theirs is not a critique of efficiency, it is a complement to it.
A third point regarding Sabel and Simon's mapping of
experimentalism, minimalism, and modern liberalism has to do with what
they see as the proper fit between law and policy, and the social world
they are meant to govern. Sabel and Simon understand "the most
pervasive challenge of current public problems" to be "the continuous
222
change and variation" in society, and that "experimentalist regimes are
especially well suited for circumstances in which effective public
intervention requires local variation and adaptation to changing
circumstances."223 Minimalists, Sabel and Simon argue, continue to
operate on the old and outdated assumption of modern liberalism (and/or
neoliberalism), while experimentalism is precisely fashioned to craft an
administrative style that makes law responsive to today's social needs.
It is here in Sabel and Simon's critique of minimalist social welfare
proposals that doubts creep in as to whether experimental pragmatism is
indeed a contemporary legal style. There is no doubt that an idea about
making law responsive to social needs is an emblem of contemporary legal
thought, but it is well known that it is here only as a relic of social legal
thought. Indeed, it is ajuristic technique that is more than a hundred years
old at this point, and what may distinguish experimentalists is their
somewhat neo-realist 22 4 tenacity for a teleological jurisprudence. Whereas
the fit between law and social need is a part of every serious policy

222. Id. at 78.
223. Id. at 56.
224. See, e.g., Symposium, Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 Wisc. L. REv. 335 (2005).
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program, experimentalists like Sabel and Simon don't see it as just a
"part"-it's key.
This central focus on changing social circumstance demands
cognizance of the relation between experimental pragmatism, realism, and
the sorts of functionalist projects found in the work of post-realists like
Lasswell and McDougal.225 There's no basis for thinking that the work of
Sabel and Simon is merely a rerun of the work of Lasswell and McDougal,
because it's clearly not. But despite the differences, they look more and
more marginal when we focus on the nature in which both scholarly duos
build off a strong diet of Dewey, take a complex view of the relation
between law and politics, eschew sharply defined policy goals in favor of
broadly stated framework goals that will be progressively defined through
works of individual practice, and advocate the need for constant flows of
information in an ongoing process of reappraisal.
So what? Should the filial relation between experimental pragmatism
and post-realist projects from the likes of Lasswell and McDougal
encourage us to locate Sabel and Simon in the bygone era of social legal
thought? If the experimental critique of minimalist regulation is clearly in
the mode of the Third Globalization, and its critique of minimalist social
welfare policy is of a piece with the Second, what to do?
A fourth point about Sabel and Simon's discussion of experimentalism,
minimalism, and modern liberalism might carry the day. In an article from
2004, Simon discussed the relation between "legal liberalism" and "legal
pragmatism." 226 In the context of the mapping at work in this discussion,
Simon appears to equate legal liberalism with modern liberalism; he
associated it with a penchant for plaintiffs in tort and civil rights cases,
defendants in criminal cases, a prioritization of moderate forms of equality
and liberty, and a tendency to track the liberal-left side of the political
spectrum. 2 27 As a consequence, Simon's liberalism clearly does not
include the legalism of either Locke or Hayek. As for "legal pragmatism,"
Simon means for the label to describe experimentalism, and while he does
admit that there are various breeds, his analysis is solely focused on the
experimental style.228
Simon's critique of liberal legalism is slippery. Coming from a deep
baseline in critical legal studies,22 9 there is little doubt about the
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adversarial posture of Simon's pragmatism. At the same time, however,
Simon seemed to be going out of his way to paint the critique as one
coming from within liberalism. After surfacing some common complaints
from critical theory, Simon distances himself from them. Noting that these
critiques "remain important and, on some points, powerful," Simon's
pragmatist approach would be "more grounded in the basic commitments
of political liberalism." 230 Moving into the rest of the discussion, as a
consequence, the reader may have expected legal pragmatism as the
coming of something like a friendly amendment, and not as much of a
radical overturning of liberal legalism.
Towards the middle of the article, Simon explains his reasoning:
At the risk of overemphasizing the contrast, I have formulated and
organized the premises so as to emphasize their differences with
Legal Liberalism. It is debatable whether the Legal Pragmatist
perspective is best seen as a competitor to the Legal Liberalism that
addresses itself to the whole field of lawyering, or rather as a
complement that purports to be more appropriate to a range of
situations but that concedes as a significant range to the Legal
Liberal approach.'
At the end, Simon left this relational question for another day, leaving us
wondering whether an ultimate answer might be less useful than a
forward-looking perspective on better discourse, whether it's called liberal
or pragmatic or whatever.
Though I do admire Simon's cautious tone, and appreciate the
complicated nature of the question, I find it appropriate to come down
with an answer here: Sabel and Simon are liberals. Now, in saying as
much I don't mean to identify them necessarily as modern liberals
working in the language of social legal thought, exiling them from the
terrain of the Third Globalization. Not at all. What I do mean to say is that
experimental pragmatism, like eclectic pragmatism, depends on a toolkit
that remains entirely comprised of the stuff of classic, modern, and

neoliberalism. If, for example, we were to join Sabel and Simon with
Lasswell and McDougal, we would expect to see the former pair joining
the latter pair's unquestionable loyalty to the modern liberal style. Sabel
and Simon have lost faith in a single style of liberal legalism, as have all
natives of contemporary legal thought. And yet, while they have no faith

230. Id.
231. Id. at 173.

20121

DEVELOPMENT & THE PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH

55

in any one style, their optimism is buoyed by a belief in the power of
deliberative democracy and the truth of the liberal, autonomous, rational
self.
To sum up, Sabel and Simon have argued that experimentalism is
operational, and therefore a real administrative style in the contemporary
scene. Of course, not everything that is happening is illustrative of
contemporary legal thought-a great many instances are just holdovers
from traditions of the past. But Sabel and Simon's claim is that it is indeed
new, and that it is explicitly formulated as an alternative to the command
and control style of modern liberalism. Second, the experimentalist
critique of minimalist regulation is clearly consistent with an eclectic
preoccupation with "what works," and for Sabel and Simon, a great deal
of the minimalist regulatory apparatus just doesn't. It wasn't that
efficiency concerns, cost-benefit analysis, or cap-and-trade programs
suffered from political or philosophical defects, but rather that they didn't
perform in the manner in which Sunstein & Associates would hope. Third,
the experimentalist critique of minimalist social welfare suggested a heavy
reliance on the jurisprudential style of social legal thought and modern
liberalism. The reliance was so heavy, and so important, that it was
enough to doubt whether experimentalism might be better located in the
Second Globalization. Fourth, experimental pragmatism appears to be
ultimately committed to liberal legalism. This commitment is not to any
single style of liberal legalism, but rather to the common liberal
vocabulary to be found in the langue of classical and social legal thought.
As a consequence, I think we can reach the tentative conclusion that
experimentalism is like minimalism in that they are both strands of the
legal pragmatism animating so much of contemporary legal thought. This
is a legal pragmatism that is notable for its attention to neoformalism,
attraction to the weighing of conflicting interests, and belief in the
combination of various styles of legal liberalism in the service of what
works. Eclectic pragmatism, and its minimalist programs, is on all fours
with this description. Experimental pragmatism, in contrast, favors
function over form and deliberation over balancing. Experimentalism is
therefore less central to the dominant conception of contemporary legal
thought (which is a good thing for experimentalists), but indigenous to
contemporary legal thought all the same: It has more functionalism than
minimalism, and less formalism, but it is similarly committed to a
pervasive if disenchanted liberalism.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The election of Barack Obama in 2008 was seen in some quarters as a
final shift away from the "free-market" conservativism of the Bush
regime, if not the end of an era of neoliberalism nearly forty years old.
This shift was similarly identified in the context of international
development policy even before President Obama's election, as
disillusionment with "shock therapy" programs administered by the socalled Washington Consensus became more apparent and intense.233 To be
sure, very few have suggested a wholesale return to the New Deal
governmentalism of the mid-20th century, for as President Obama said
himself in an eminently contemporary fashion, "[tihe question we ask
today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it
works."234 What we are striving towards is "a strategy no longer driven by
ideology and politics but one that is based on a realistic assessment of the
sobering facts on the ground."235 In fact, the suggestion that we are in the
midst of a paradigm shift seems to take its cue from this new sense about
pragmatism over purity, a new focus on what works, what will get the job
done.236
Veteran observers of the field seem to think as much. David Trubek,
for example, wrote in 2006 of the mounting criticisms of the neoliberal
policy establishment,237 and of how these complaints appeared to have
"succeeded in opening up the discourse. The moment seems more open,
232. Ed Rubin has recently written: "By the end of his two terms in office, Bush had not only
wrecked the nation, but also wrecked the model of government that had dominated national politics for
twenty-eight years. The purpose of this essay is to explore the possibility that the Obama
Administration will develop a new model, a new approach to governing America." Edward Rubin,
Can the Obama Administration Renew American Regulatory Policy?, 65 U. MIAMI L. REv. 357
(2011). See also Peter Boyer, Getting to No: The RepublicanDilemma in the Age of Obama, THE NEW
YORKER, Sept. 28, 2009, at 32.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html) (emphasis added).
235. See Ryan Lizza, The Consequentialist, THE NEW YORKER, May 2, 2011, available at
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the discourse more fluid."238 But Trubek's assessment was
characteristically cautious: "So the question is this: in this period of
rethinking and partial doubt, is there a real chance for the recognition of
alternative development strategies and of very different legal paths that
can be followed on the road to economic growth and political freedom? Is
it possible, for example, that acceptance of pragmatism could replace faith
in formalism . . . ?"239 Trubek answered in the affirmative, hopefully
seeing in the present "a turning point, a moment in which it is possible to
go beyond critique of orthodoxy to reconstruction."240
Another well-known critic of international development discourse,
David Kennedy, has more recently offered a similarly optimistic view of a
new and unfolding moment.241 Kennedy suggests that just as a new space
opened up after the discrediting of the first wave of development practice
and in the Reagan-Thatcher zeitgeist, we have also witnessed a similar
eventuality in the chastening of neoliberalism. Kennedy writes, "When the
unity and self-confidence of development economics ebbs, as occurred in
the nineteen seventies and is again the case today, and the details and
context for policy seem more salient, ideas about law and institutions often
lie closer to the surface in discussions of development policy." 24 2 The
result, Kennedy and Trubek agree, is that a new chance is on offer in
which previously unorthodox approaches to law, economics, and
sociology, might find themselves, quite surprisingly, in a mainstream
alliance. The hope for such a "heterogenous alliance," Kennedy explains,
is for it "to expand the potential for institutional, doctrinal and policy
experimentation-to embolden the policy class to accept the need for
economic, political and ethical choice and improve the tools by which they
can come to that challenge free of unhelpful professional habits and
deformations."243
The aim of this Article has been to build on the framework already
sketched by Trubek and Kennedy, and bring focus to the possibility of "a
new moment" in the law and development field. For some, these novel

238. Id. at 93.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. David Kennedy, Laiw and Development Economics, supra note 8. For contrasting views see,
e.g., Kevin Davis & Michael Trebilock, The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists
versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895 (2008); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy ofSociety and the
FailuresofLaiw and Development, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 209 (2011); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in
the Rule ofLaiw Orthodoxy (Carnegie Endowment Working Papers, No. 30, 2002).
242. David Kennedy, Law and Development Economics, supranote 8, at 1.
243. Id. at 56 (emphasis added)
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characteristics may have something to do with an evolving triumph of
pragmatism and experimentalism over formalism and ideology, of Obama
over Bush. I think that the identification of a new pragmatic
experimentalism on the scene is precisely right, and that pragmatism has a
great deal to do with the new turn in development policy. However, my
unfortunate suspicion is that we may have less reason to welcome the
"new moment" once we take a closer look at the sort of pragmatism that
seems to have captured the spirit of the time.244
In doing so, I adopted the same intellectual history of law that has
played a role in Trubek and Kennedy's work-that of Duncan Kennedy's
essay "Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought." 2 45 In that work,
Kennedy argues that since the US Civil War, lawyers, judges, and
policymakers in the United States have participated in three phases of a
global legal consciousness. Each phase globalized, Kennedy explains, at
times representing the movement of legal ideas from Europe to the US,
and at others in the reverse. The first globalization involved the
transmission of "classical" ideas from Europe to the US, the second
globalization involved more of a back and forth cross-Atlantic movement
of "social" legal ideas, and the third globalization, in which we are now
living, holds the United States at the core. What is helpful to understand
about the map is that not everything that is happening now is necessarily
indigenous to the contemporary legal thought of the third globalization.
It's better to think of contemporary legal thought as a style or aesthetic
than a period of time, such that we may very well see contemporary jurists
operating in the outdated mode of, say, classical legal thought, just as
contemporary musicians might perform in a style that was for more
popular a hundred years ago.
This Article has sought to shed light on the question of whether the
field of law and development has entered a new moment-a phase which
can be meaningfully distinguished from the modern liberalism and
neoliberalism of prior times. The argument has been in the affirmative,
and following the lead of Duncan Kennedy, David Trubek, and David
Kennedy, it has been in agreement with the idea that contemporary legal
thought is comprised of contrasting tendencies. Where the present
discussion has veered off has been in its suggestion that contemporary
legal thought is housed in a pragmatic structure that enables and maintains
minimalist commitments to neoformalism and balancing techniques,
244. My thinking here follows the poststructuralist approach of Arturo Escobar in ENCOUNTERING
DEVELOPMENT 42 (1995).
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instead of being emancipated by a pragmatism that rebukes them. This
enabling pragmatism is of a specific kind, however, and it boasts an
eclecticism and minimalism drawn from an apparently endless wellspring
of "everyday" "can-do attitudes" about "getting the job done." This is a
vulgar, everyday pragmatism, and it provides the basis for the dominant
legal pragmatism of today.
If contemporary legal thought is going to witness a new moment of a
more hopeful kind, it will have to shake itself out of the problem-solving
ethos of eclectic pragmatism. This will be a tall order, essentially requiring
the will to terminate the interminable circles of liberal legalism and its
recycled images of market and state. Perhaps experimentalism is the way
to go, and just as experimentalists would have it, we'll never really know
for sure. All we can do is try, and then keep trying.

